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ABSTRACT
Because America's economy relies to a significant degree on export markets and
external sources of raw materials, the health of the international trading system is critical
to the national security of the United States. This thesis demonstrates that the
organization on which America has relied for the management of the international trading
system since the 1950s, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is failing
to effectively fulfill its role of international trade regulation. It is argued that because of
that failure, an alternative global trading structure based on a triad of large regional free
trade areas (FTAs) is developing. It is proven, using the generally accepted tenets of
customs union theory, that the impact on the United States of such a triad could be
generally positive in the absence of a functioning GATT. Based on this economic
analysis, broad American trade policy guidelines are proposed to maximize American
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With East-West political tensions reduced and ideologically based political
relationships in decline, America's international economic relationships are now
substantially more important than they have been in the past. Unfortunately, in
today's changing world the international economy seems to be increasingly adrift
as historically important trading associations fail and new ones are created.
Some analysts have cautioned that recent internahonal trends toward the
development of regional economic relationships known as Free Trade Areas
(FTAs) will inevitably lead to the formation of economic trading blocs and a new
era of hostility in the global economic environment. These same analysts often
predict that FTA creation may well presage so-called trade wars or, at the
extreme, the possibility of armed conflict.
Clearly, the developing relationships characterized as FTAs must be handled
properly. FTA development and potential economic consequences thus lead
American policy considerations today. American foreign policymakers must
correctly address these evolving international economic relationships to ensure
continued U.S. economic vitality. This thesis is intended to assist in the resolution
of the current American policy dilemma concerning the future of Free Trade
Areas. To that end, issues relating to the apparent failure of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to resolve long standing restrictive trade
Vll
practices and growing trends in the global economy toward the pursuit of
economic interests within a regional framework of free trade agreements are
addressed. Initially, the GATT is explored to conclude that the organization's
future as a forum for the management of international trade is not bright. It is
demonstrated that GATT's future is limited due to the presence of particularly
divisive issues in the ongoing Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and, more
importantly, significant long-term structural shortcomings.
Because GATT may not provide sufficient structure for the management of
global trading relationships, current international trends toward the development
of regional economic associations based on FTAs are considered. It is specifically
argued that, at present, three major regional organizations show potential for
further development, the European Community (EC), the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
It is further argued that these regional economic groupings will probably form an
economic triad capable of controlling a large porhon of future international trade.
To illustrate these areas' potential economic influence, their development and
current characteristics are briefly profiled.
In the pivotal section of this thesis, the economic theories associated with
customs unions analysis are used to investigate the potential economic effects of
the above triad-based global economic structure with emphasis on its effect on the
economy of the United States. I argue that a triad based system of FTAs will not,
as some analysts have suggested, necessarily have negative economic
Vlll
consequences for this country. Such a system, in the absence of a viable GATT
structure, may in fact, hold economic benefits for the U.S if properly constructed.
Of equal significance, such a triad could lead to greater international cooperation
under the auspices of GATT in the future.
In conclusion, broad U.S. econo^nic policy objectives that are intended to
maximize American advantage under a developing FTA system are offered. The
conscious pursuit by America of a dual track approach toward internahonal trade
relationships is recommended. It is argued that the first track should be based on
the revitalization of the GATT process, with a goal of expanding, and "re-
inshtutionalizing" that international trade organization, allowing it to adapt to a
more regional perspective. A second, related track should emphasize the
acceptance and encouragement of a regional approach to trade liberalizahon by
the United States. It is argued that such an approach would preserve American
advantage in the existing trading system while laying a solid foundation for




The end of the "Cold War" between the United States and the Soviet Union
has forced the world to move beyond bipolar structures to a nnore multipolar
system. More importantly, it has spurred consideration of non-military issues by
international actors. Economic concerns have replaced military concerns in
international political relationships. Central among these issues are those
concerning international trade relations, tiade alliances, and the global economy.
In the over 40 years since World War II, world trade has expanded from
approximately $60 billion to $4 trillion U.S. dollars and continues to grow.' Also,
more countries are involved in international trade relationships than ever before.
Growth in international trade has increased levels of regional interdependence as
other nations, both newly industrialized and developing, forge or renew trade
relationships. It has also strained existing trade relationships. Current trade
infrastructure, based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was
clearly not designed to handle 'the resulting trade problems.'
Exacerbating the crisis in the GATT is the fact that America, though still the
world's largest trading nation (accounting for about 12 percent of all international
trade), is no longer the economic giant that dominated the world at the close of
World War 11.'^ The U.S. is no longer capable, therefore, of dominatmg GATT
negotiations and policies as it has at times in the past.
Realistically the U.S. may only be capable of limited leadership in the
modern global economic system. It seems to many that, lacking leadership, the
world trading structure is increasingly drifting into a structure defined by
regional units. ^ This new system poses two questions for American policymakers.
First, how will developing regional economic relationships affect the U.S.
economy? Second, what is the appropriate U.S. policy response in a world where
the influence and credibility of GATT is waning?
This thesis proposes to aid in the ongoing policymaking process by
answering the above questions and by determining the appropriate American
trade policy orientation in a regionally structured trading system. To that end, it
will initially prove:
• First, that the GATT system of trade regulation is failing to provide the
infrastructure necessary to fully regulate world trade. Failure of GATT will
lead to a revolution in trade relations.^
• Second, the most likely alternative for the resulting global trading system is
a structure based upon certain major customs unions or regional free trade
areas (FTAs).'
Three FTAs, the European Community (EC), the proposed North American
Free Trade Area (NFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are more likely to exert major influence on the global trading system
than others.' These major regional trading units will thus be briefly examined
later in the thesis to summarize their possible development profile and chief
characteristics. However, a quick initial look at these nation's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) figures, as compared to the rest of the world (ROW), will illustrate
how much influence these regions now have on the world economy and thus how
powerful such a system could be (Table I).
TABLE I.






* including Japan and the Asian NIEs.
Sources: International Marketing Data and Statistics 1992, 16th edition (London; Euromonitor, 1992).
Although the formation of these three unions cannot be taken for granted, the
evidence presented will make it clear that the predicted outcomes are likely
enough to be reflected in U.S. policy considerations.*
Based on the evidence presented above concerning the future of the
international economy, the central hypothesis of this paper will be discussed."^ It
will be proven that:
The growth of regional trading blocs, within specific boundaries, will have
minimal, if any, negative economic effects on the American economy as long
as they are subject to basic GATT requirements concerning customs unions.
They may, in fact, provide an alternative path to greater global trade
freedom.
Due to their minimal potential economic effects, regional trade agreements,
subject to the requirements of the GATT, should not be discouraged by U.S.
policymakers. A trade policy orientation encouraging the formation of regional
free trade areas, combined with continued efforts to expand GATT, should allow
America to reap maximum gains from the evolving system.
A. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
What defines an FTA? Noted economist Jeffrey J. Schott has proposed that
FTAs:
...eliminate barriers to trade at the border between the partner countries.
Unlike customs unions, however, each country maintains its own restrictions
against trade from third countries. As a result, FTA partner countries receive
preferential access to each other's markets at the expense oi nonmembers.''^'
Certainly FTAs discriminate externally against nonmembers. However, so do
individual national actors. Discrimination in external trade is no more a
characteristic of an FTA than it is a characteristic of any other national actor.
What Dr. Schott is emphasizing is the fact that an FTA, unlike a customs union,
retains a certain element of control over its external policy while conforming to
FTA rules in its internal relations. Economist Ali M. El-Agraa confirms this
definition, emphasizing:
...member nations remove all trade impediments among themselves but
retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-
vis the outside world. ..^^
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, an FTA will be defined simply as a group
of independent national actors who eliminate all (or a portion) of trade barriers
between themselves by means of a formal treaty while preserving the right to
independent action in external relations. No preconceived notions as to the nature
of external relations will be included. '^^
Evolution into a structure based on regional FTAs is a plausible future for
international trading system. In fact, in the U.S., over 88 percent of business
executives believe that the world economy is shifting toward a more regional,
trading bloc orientation. ^"^ Many economists, trade analysts, and political leaders
agree.''* Nevertheless, on the topic of regionalism's effects, like many other
economic issues, opinions are widely divergent. Those who applaud the evolution
of the international system into such a form often base their views on the
perceived benefits of such a system (Table II). Conversely, those who oppose an
FTA structure sometimes base their views on an FTA structure's perceived
negative effects (Table HI).
TABLE II.
POSSIBLE BENEnXS OF FTAs
• MORE EASILY TAILORED TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTAXCES
• ALLOW MORE RAPID LIBERALIZATION' THAN GATT
BECAUSE OF COMPLIMENTARY OBJECTIVES-ELIMINATES:
1. FOOT DRAGGERS-MEMBERS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
CONSENSUS RULES TO BLOCK PROGRESS UNTIL THEIR
DEMANDS ARE MET
2. CONVOY EFFECTS-LEAST WILLING PARTICIPANT
DETERMINES THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS
3. FREE RIDERS-MEMBERS ENJOYING MEN PRIVILEGES
WHILE ESCAPING OBLIGATIONS
• CONTRIBUTES TO EVOLUTION OF GATT (PARTICULARLY
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
• PROMOTES PROGRESS IN AREAS NOT COVERED BY GATT
• MAY LIMIT THE NUMBER OF NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN
GATT
• GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF POSTTIVE OUTCOME BECAUSE
NEGOTIATIONS LIMITED-ISSUES AND PARTIES
• RAPID PACE CREATES INCENTIVE FOR FURTHER REFORM,
FUTUT^E AGREEMENTS
• MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS LIKELY
• CREATES BILATERAL CONHDENCE THAT MAY LEAD TO
MULTILATERAL PROGRESS
• DIRECTS ATTENTION TO NEW AND IMPORTANT TREADING
PARTNERS
• REDUCES BILATERAL TRADE BALANCES
• CREATES TRADE BY REDUCING INTERNATIONAL BARRIERS
• PRESERVES AND EXPANDS MARKET ACCESS
• IMPROVES POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
• PROMOTES SOCIAL STABILITY AMONG POORER PARTNERS
• PROVIDES A VEHICLE TO CHALLENGE PROTECTIONISM IN-
OTHER BLOCS
TABLE III.
POSSIBLE COSTS OF FTAs
DIMINISHMENT OF MFN AND GATT GAINS
DETRACTS FROM FOCUS ON URUGUAY ROUND
UNLIKELY TO ADDRESS BILATERAL IMBALANCES
POTENTIAL SOVEREIGNTY LOSSES
IF ETA GOALS NOT ACHIEVED THEN BILATERAL RELATIONS
MIGHT WORSEN
• WITH MULTIPLE FTAs:
1. CREATION OF RULE OF ORIGIN PROBLEMS
2. SEQUENCING OF FTAs A PROBLEM
3. OLD PARTNER RESENTMENT OF NEW PARTNER BETTER
DEAL COULD CAUSE TENSION
As an international system based on FTAs evolved, both positive and
negative scenarios can be imagined. FTAs might increase overall economic
efficiency. They might result in trade growth and the creahon of needed
consensus capable of promoting the further reduction of international trade
barriers. If so, they could be integrated into some type of world trading system.
Proponents of this plausible future would assume the creation of a World Trading
Organization (WTO) or some other similar structure to provide the structure that
the GATT cannot. Presumably, since the United States has long been an advocate
of world free trade, such an outcome would be perceived as beneficial to the U.S.
economy. Carried to its logical extreme, this alternative might envision the
complete integration of the international economy under some type of all-
inclusive global economic structure.
Alternatively, the opposing perspective would be a retreat of the global
trading system to an isolationist structure, similar in some ways to that of the
1930s. Based on hostile FTA regionalism instead of nationalism, such a system
would engage in competitive and highly discriminatory trade practices that could
result in the disintegration of the global trading system, distortion of world
markets, world-wide depression, and ultimately war between polarized blocs.
This, a doomsayer's perspective, could envision a world that failed to learn any
lessons from the protectionist structure of the 1930s rushing headlong to its own
destruction. Obviously, no nation would benefit from this outcome.
A review of the existing literature indicates that trade and policy experts
have mixed views on the development of a trading bloc system. These views
range from support of FTAs as trade expanding and growth promoting to
insistence that regional blocs will lead only to increased protectionism and
possible future trade wars.
Richard Tropp, a trade analyst with the Washington Capital Development
Corporation, has argued that regional trading blocs should be used "rationally"
to help developing countries expand external markets. He further states that
"...these trading agreements present opportunities for, vice barriers to, U.S.
business. "^^ Rudiger Dornbusch of Massachusetts Institute of Technology also
takes the positive view. He has argued that regionalism offers the opportunity for
more trade within the region and "...need not cause trade wars between
compehng blocks (sic)."'^ Finally, Peter Morici, of the University of Maine states
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that regional agreements will "...provide some of the benefits of multilateral
liberalization with more predictable and controllable adjustment costs."'''
Jagdish Bhagwati, who is often described as the leading academic opponent
of regional agreements, has argued that FTAs send signals of protectionism and
undermine the GATT process. For these reasons, if no other, he believes they are
a detriment to the global trading system.'**
Michael Aho and Johnathan David Aronson, trade experts who have written
extensively on the future of the GATT, take a more extreme view. Thev have
discussed the scenario of trading bloc wars, saying:
The danger is that if progress in GATT slows or evaporates altogether while
regional trade bargains proceed, the world trade system could end up being
divided into blocs, each surrounded by walls of trade barriers. The benefits
of global trade could be lost. Business investment made on the basis of
world markets would be frustrated. Economies of large scale would be
sacrificed. And what remains of GATT discipline and principles could
collapse. Interregional or global trade wars could take place, with
devastating impact on many economies and on global economic
cooperation.'^
Aho and Aronson's judgement regarding trading blocs leaves no doubt that they
would prefer to maintain the status quo of GATT rather than continue any
evolution toward a system of regional FTAs. This scenario, in its extreme
formulation, could lead not only to economic "warfare" but to military
confrontation as well.
Is this dismal forecast accurate? Is the GATT system failing and leading to
inevitable regional trade wars? The continued viability of the GATT will
obviously be an initial determinant of the future of the world trading system. The
future of the GATT is thus an appropriate topic for initial examination.
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II. GATT
Recently, debate on changing global economic relationships has centered on
the future of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Specifically,
the conhnuing stalemate in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations has
clouded the future of this trade management organization.
This chapter proposes to examine the status of the GATT. By describing the
factors affecting the formation of the organization, its fundamental features, its
infrastructure, and its policy-making process, the evolution oi GATT will be
explored. Additionally, the potential for a successful conclusion to the ongoing
Uruguay Round of negotiations will be examined. Thoughtful consideration of
these issues will demonstrate that, even if agreement is reached, the Uruguay
Round is unlikely to generate either international consensus or American
satisfaction. Lack of a satisfactory outcome may lead to the growth of alternative
trade management structures in the form of regional tiade agreements.
A. FACTORS AFFECTING GATT FORMATION
GATT has its roots in the problems created by the "Great Depression" of the
1930s. Prior to this period, the United States (and other countiies) sought to
promote their industries by protecting them against the dominant, historically
free-tiade oriented British industrial machine.'^"
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By the late 1920s and early 1930s, with international economic problems
mounting, protectionism was on the increase. Bilateral agreements and nationalist
sentiments began to dominate the international trading system. The extensively
protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1930,
helped spur world-wide declines in trade, massive job losses, declining industrial
output, and a worsening international financial crisis.'' Other countries
institutionalized protectionist barriers such as high tariffs, import/export quotas,
exchange controls, defensive economic alliances, and industrial subsidization in
retaliation for American actions.^ As a result, world trade fell by two-thirds
between 1929 and 1933.*^"' U.S. exports plunged as well. The economic
nationalism that emerged almost certainly contributed to the beginning of the
depression. Fortunately, landmark American legislation in the form of the 1934
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act led the road to improved relations. Within ten
years, the U.S. had formed bilateral agreements with 27 countries.'"*
At the close of WW II, it became clear to many that protectionist measures
were in danger of becoming permanent unless pre-depression multi-lateral trade
patterns were reestablished.'^' With that realization, and the essenhal
encouragement of the United States and Britain, general international consensus
was established to attempt an agreement limiting protectionism.
Momentum gained from the approval of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (or World
Bank) led the U.S. to propose negotiations toward a "Havana Charter." The
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charter was intended to provide for the formahon of an international trade
management organization.'^ The resulting International Trade Organization (ITO)
proposal was hoped to provide a "multi-lateral framework for international
economic relahons."'' GATT, proposed virtually simultaneously, was intended
only as an "temporary" organization to oversee international trade until the
proposed ITO was approved by Havana negotiators and ratified by its signatories.
GATT negotiations began in Geneva on 10 April 1947 with several primary
goals. A primary objective of the conferees was to concentrate on the "substanhal
reductions of tariffs and other trade barriers and to the elimination of preferences
on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. "^^ Another primary goal,
however, was to "draft a charter" for upcoming ITO negohations in Havana. "^^
Both objectives were accomplished. Agreement on the GATT was concluded on
30 October 1947 and signed by 23 nation-states at the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment.
The proposed charter for an ITO was forwarded to Havana where
negotiations began on 21 November 1947 and concluded successfully on 24 March
1948.^° Unfortunately however, successful conclusion of the negohations did not
ensure ITO ratification. The United States (and several other countries) balked at
joining the comprehensive structure created by the ITO, preferring instead to
make permanent the less restrictive objectives of the GATT.^^
GATT, the international organization that is the center of modern
international trade relations, was actually implemented in January 1948. Since that
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time it has sought to live up to goals identified in its founding document's
preamble, advocahng:
Relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
production and the exchange of goods; being desirous of contributing to
these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce...'*'^
Carefully attempting to balance the above goals in an effort to create economic
efficiency, while minimizing distortions of member nation sovereignty, has been
the fundamental aim of the GATT.
^ / Proponents who believe the GATT has met its stated ideals cite its vastly
expanded membership and the growth in world trade under GATT auspices to
illustrate its success. Their claims are not without merit. GATT's first round led
to commitments to "bind or lower" 45,000 separate tariff restrictions.'''' Also, from
an initial membership of 23 nations in 1948, the GATT, by June of 1992, had 108
full members (including over 75 developing countries) and many others either
requesting membership or identified as associate members. Further, GATT
members now account for 80 percent of world trade. "^ Through seven rounds of
multilateral negotiations, excluding the currently stagnated Uruguay Round, the
GATT retained the initiative in promoting the growth of world trade and
multilateralism (Appendix A).
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B. THE GATT AGREEMENT
The GATT agreement is composed of 34 articles, 15 of which define the
agreements essential characteristics. Article 1, often cited as the central feature of
the agreement, establishes most-favored nation (MFN) treatment in tariffs among
all member nations.^^ MFN status is designed to lead to overall trade
liberalization and minimization of the market distortions associated with state
protectionism. These goals are intended to be achieved through the removal of
quotas, reduction of tariffs, and reduction of barriers to trade in goods via
reciprocal trading agreements. Article 2 contains basic tariff concession schedules
resulting from the conference. Article 3 provides rules for the assessment of
internal taxes. Articles 4 to 10 address technical aspects of trade (including anti-
dumping measures in Article 6) and articles 11 to 15 deal with quantitative
restrictions (quotas). The remaining articles deal primarily with
administrative/ technical aspects of the agreement such as treaty exceptions,
alternative structures, and violation procedures. ^^
Most important (and currently most controversial) of the last 19 articles is
Article 24, which covers, among other issues, the creation of customs unions.
Though the agreement requires that such unions conform to GATT principles, this
article effectively modifies Article 1 to allow the creation of Free Trade Areas
(FTAs). Thus, even though it is generally accepted that external discrimination in
a free trade area (FTA) is inherent, they are legal under the GATT.^^
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Article 24 requires that GATT be notified of the FTA's existence (part 3a),
that the FTA cover all merchandise trade between participating nations (part 4),
and that the FTA must not be formed to raise trade barriers to nations outside the
' area (part 4). Despite the fact that GATT has considered at least 69 FTA and
preferential trade agreements since its inception, these requirements have rarely
been met in practice. Most of the above edicts, particularly those concerning
external barriers, have been obviously violated in principle (and m practice) by
existing FTAs. This is, at least in part, because of the early American endorsement
of the formation of the EC. Though American policymakers expected the EC to
violate Article 24, its potential political benefits were, at the time, expected to
outweigh the potential negative trade effects.
Still, despite the failure of GATT to enforce the requirements of article 24,
experts feel that the organization has been relatively successful in addressing
many trade issues. Its success has been in its ability to deal with issues that are
"...clearly defined and that are perceived as serious by the most influential
contracting countnes.
There are, however, certain areas associated with international trade that
GATT does not address. The organization does not directly consider the
intangible benefits of trade (such as the social relationships produced by trade),
nor does it consider the associated social costs (such as minimum wages or child
labor laws).^^ Its sole purpose is to further trade freedom.
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C GATT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The organizational structure that has given GATT its success in the past is
relahvely similar to other international organizations under the umbrella of the
United Nations. It is composed of a Secretariat, a Council of Representatives, and
the general membership (see Appendix B for a more complete description of these
bodies). Sub-groups (committees and councils), meet as required under the
auspices of the central organs (Appendix C). Both the Secretariat and the
membership normally meet annually while the Council meets as needed to handle
business between sessions. ^'^ Members of GATT contribute to the organizarion
based on the level of participahon in the total trade between contracting parties
and their associated governments. As in many other UN organizations,
agreements under GATT auspices are included in protocols (approved essentially
by consensus) which must then be ratified by member states.
The above organization has been an effective forum for trade discussions for
many years. However, the effectiveness of the GATT has not been due so much
to any uniqueness of structure as it is to continued active member participation.
To understand the reasons nations have and continue to maintain active GATT
membership it is important to understand their goals in affiliation. To that subject
we now turn.
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D. FACTORS INFLUENCING NATIONAL AFFILIATION
Members of GATT have joined the organization for a multitude of different
reasons. This sub-section specifically explores three categories of international
actors' motivations for seeking and continuing membership in the GATT. First,
Europe, America, and Japan will be examined as representative of the
industrialized participation in the agreement. Though not an inclusive sample, it
is probable that this group represents the general universe of membership goals
of much of the democratic, industrialized world. Two other general groupings
will also be examined, developing countries and those with centrallv planned
economies. These major structural groups, though again not all sharing exactly
the same specific motivators toward GATT, nevertheless share enough general
characteristics to be evaluated as a group.
The United States, along with the European Community (EC), and Japan
have, since WW II, been considered,the three industrial pillars of the world
trading system. These nations reasons for participating in GATT are generally
based in desires to maintain influence over the functioning of the international
trading system.
For the U.S., the organization has been a vehicle for espousing a stated
national free-trade policy. Nevertheless, despite its public support of laissez-faire
practices, the U.S. has, at times, used GATT principles to promote the protection
of its own industries."" More fundamentally, GATT has allowed the U.S.
relatively unrestricted access to internarional markets while providing an effective
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forum for the influencing of other nation's economies (on the strength of post-
WW n American economic supremacy). Access and influence remain the primary
reason for American participahon.
The ability of the U.S. to influence other economies through GATT because
of its post-WW II dominance has been a mixed blessing. Because of that
dominance, the U.S. has been pressured by other members to accept a large
number of unfavorable concessions. In fact, according to Clyde Prestowitz of the
Economic Strategy Institute, the United States has traditionally given more
concessions than it has received.'^ For this reason, and others, American
business, government and labor leaders are increasingly viewing GATT as a "very
weak system" that is slow to enforce trading rules.'*^ As a result, the attitudes
toward current levels of American participation in GATT are clearly undergoing
change.
First priorities for American negotiators in the current round include rules
limiting subsidies, the protection of intellectual property rights, rules on
investment, and rules protecting trade in services. Though membership continues
to be seen by American decisionmakers as generally beneficial, future
participation depends largely on the successful completion of negotiation on the
above (and other) issues during the ongoing Uruguay Round.
For Western Europe, generally considered to be represented today by the
European Community (EC), membership in GATT has also provided access and
influence in the international trading system. Additionally, since the Kennedy
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Round of GATT negotiation in thie 1960s, the organization has been a vehicle for
the protection of European self-sufficiency in agricultural production."" This issue
continues to be the most controversial of ongoing Uruguay Round negohations.
According to some experts, many in Europe see participation in GATT
negotiations as "...a way of bringing external pressure to bear on the Community
and the individual (EC) members to liberalize and reform some of the practices
that are retarding its economic performance.'"*^ Thus, EC participation m GATT
may have been not only to ensure international influence on trade issues but also
to promote more narrowly focused regional interests as well.
Japan's propensihes for GATT participation mirror those of the U.S. and the
EC with very minor differences. Though sectors protected and trade goals differ
from those pursued by the EC and U.S., Japan's reasons for participation in GATT
remain fundamentally anchored in the desire to maintain both the access and the
influence displayed by the other "pillars" of the world trading svstem.
According to Asian specialist Andrew Elek, "GATT has made it possible for
Japan and other Western Pacific economies to exploit their comparative
advantage."'*^ GATT participation has allowed Japan and certain other newly
industrialized Asian countries to pursue trade essential to their post-WW II
economic growth, invest in other nations with only limited restrictions, and
protect their own influential agricultural base without facing trade-restricting
f
tariff and quota restrichons from their trading partners. Further, because 'Japan
finds it easier to bow to multi-lateral pressure, such as that from GATT, than to
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bilateral demands from its major trading partners" the organization provides a
valuable mechanism for the use of Japanese officials if accommodation is desired
in trade disputes."*^
Developing countries reasons for participation in the GATT often vary from
nation to nation and region to region depending on levels of industrialization and
international socialization. Despite such variance, common themes emerge.
Participation for these nations is vital because "the sectors in which they have
comparative advantage according to the traditional factor endowment theory of
trade—land and labor intensive products—are the most protected."""^ Special
regimes in many wealthier, industrialized countries govern trade in agriculture,
textiles /apparel, and steel. Ensuring access to these markets, is, for developing
countries, essential to continued growth. Thus, as a group, developing nations
often have the most to gain from an efficiently functioning, free-trade oriented
GATT.
In spite of the potential positive benefits of GATT developing nations ability
to participate fully in the agreement is often constrained by several factors.
^'^
First, many of these countries feel they are forced to actively promote exports
while simultaneously erecting barriers to imports. This creates hostility among the
more developed countries trying to promote their own products in the
internahonal marketplace. Second, often developing narions are "more
comfortable" negotiating bilateral trade agreements with key trading partners
instead of participating in more multi-lateral negotiations. Such attitudes make
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progress in international forums difficult. Third, these nations, at times tend to
favor national mterests (for obvious reasons) over group discipline. This tendency
often leads to inaction on GATT issues.
In the context of current negotiations developing countries will be seeking
to preserve preferential treatment in market access (tariff reductions below those
required by MFN) previously granted by developed countries. They will also seek
to force greater adherence to GATT rules by industrial countries while avoiding
the imposition of new rules restricting their own protective trade practices.
Finally, many will seek, on an individual level, to preserve their privileged status
as a developing country as their Gross National Products (GNPs) rise to levels
approaching those of smaller industrialized countries.
Other potential and current members of GATT may fit somewhere in
between developing and industrialized country parameters. These actors include
primarily the communist and emerging formerly communist countries of China,
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.^° Several theories seek to explain
these nation's desire for membership. ^^ A first theory, known as the realist view,
explains desires for association with GATT in terms of the political and security
enhancements gained through internationally visible membership. A second
theory, that of mercantilism, explains desires for membership by drawing heavily
on the realist view. However, instead of focusing on the political/ security
advantages ofGATT membership, the mercantilist theory focuses on the economic
gains reahzed by participation. Regime theory, a final explanation, emphasizes the
T)
desire to maintain international prestige through the support of the status quo in
existing international regimes.
Such theories seem to explain at least part of the motivations behind these
nations participation in GATT. However, more extensive research will be required
as new relationships mature in these countries to fully understand their desires
for membership.
Disparities in goals for the GATT between developing counties and major
industrial countries remain widely divergent depending on factors too extensive
to fully evaluate here. It is clear, however, that such differences have, and will
continue to, greatly affect the future of the GATT as an international organization.
In order to understand how that future may develop, we will next consider the
organization's historical decisionmaking process.
E. GATT POLICYMAKING PROCESS 1948-1979
Formal GATT negotiations began with the 1947 discussions in Geneva. These
rounds, and the five that followed from 1949 to 1962, were almost exclusively
focused on tariff reduction issues. As a direct result of these successful
negotiations, tariffs were reduced substantially from post WW II levels and most
non-agricultural quotas were eliminated.'' Notably, however, each set of
negotiations took increasing time to reach agreement. Both growing membership
and increasingly divisive issues may have been at the root of the increase. Other
highlights of these rounds included, "temporary" exceptions granted to agriculture
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(1955) and the textile trade (1961) that were later institutionalized.'^^ Not
surprisingly, these exemptions continue to generate controversy in current
negotiations.
Increasing international concern over growing protectionist trends help spur
the beginning of the Kennedy Round of GATT talks which began in 1963.^
These talks were likewise considered a success and concluded in 1967. Again
focusing on tariff reductions, this set of negotiations managed to reduce average
tariffs by 36 to 39 percent from previous levels." Some strides were made in the
increasingly important area of non-tariff barriers as well, perhaps because
consensus was becoming more difficult to achieve as tariff reductions cut more
deeply into national trade revenues.
The Tokyo Round of GATT talks, which were held from 1973 to 1979 began
as an indirect result of the previously mentioned Bretton Woods monetarv
system's failure and continuing protectionist trends.'^ These talks focused much
more intensively than any previous round on non-tariff barriers. Major
accomplishments of this round included the approval of codes of conduct on such
barriers. Additional areas of significant progress included: revision of GATT anti-
dumping codes, a sectoral agreement on the free trade of civil aircraft, and an
agreement on the management of textile trade that later evolved into the
controversial Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).''' Other accomplishments featured
a further reduction of tariffs on industrial products by approximately 27 percent
(to an average of five percent), new dispute settlement procedures, and an
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important "enabling clause" that allowed preferential treatment for developing
countries under a previously signed 1971 accord/^ Unfortunately, in a failure
that was an omen of things to come, the round failed to result in a safeguards
agreement (temporary emergency actions designed to protect threatened
industries). This failure converted what was otherwise a successful round into
merely a holding action against a rising hde of protectionism.^^
F. URUGUAY ROUND PRELIMINARIES
The 1982 GATT ministerial meeting in Geneva provided the initial impetus
for the Uruguay Round of negotiations. During this meeting, despite some minor
breakthroughs, disagreements that were thought to be resolved resurfaced in the
areas of agriculture, services, investment practices, and technology.^" Failures
encountered in implementing Tokyo Round agreements were also discussed.
Conflict centered on GATT rules concerning agricultural trade. In addihon to the
minor breakthroughs that were made, the 88 members present signed resoluhons
stating their support of the GATT and agreeing on a declaration of trading system
problems to be faced in a future negotiating round.
Proposals for a new round, spearheaded by the United States, Japan, and
Canada remained the subject of intensive debate until the Council meetings of
July and September 1985.^^ Opposition came primarily from developing countries
concerned that charges of protectionism would force reductions in their privileges.
During these meetings a slim majority followed the lead of a group headed by the
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United States to call for a new ministerial meeting. The Punte del Este meetings
that followed m January 1986 resulted m a ministerial declaration opening the
Uruguay Round.
G. THE URUGUAY ROUND
The ongoing negotiations of GATT's Uruguay Round, which began in
January 1986, initially aimed at resolving issues concerning safeguards,
agricultural trade, texhles, quantitative restrictions, and tropical products .^"^ They
also sought to resolve substantial areas of controversy remaining over the
implementation of the previous (Tokyo) round of talks."
The talks, which began with 78 member teams in 1986, currentlv involve
negotiating teams from 108 countries. The round had an initial deadline of
December 1990. However, in October 1992, it remains deadlocked. Further,
prospects of completion by the most recently set implementation deadline of 1
January 1993 look doubtful.
During the negohahons, by almost any measure, the Uruguay Round has
failed to achieve its goals. Talks have virtually stalemated on the agricultural
question, services regulations, intellectual property rights, and investment
restrictions (among other issues). To illuininate the stalemate, this section will
seek to examine the progress of the talks since 1986 and some of the more visible
controversies.
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The entering attitudes of participating nations affected the talks from the
outset. American business and administration officials were generally supportive
about the prospect of resumed talks. Congress, however, was actually making
openly protectionist speeches. This led to a dualism in the U.S. negotiating stance
which shll persists.^ Europe, according to trade specialists Michael Aho and
Johnathan David Aronson, supported talks with an "...air of resignation, but with
no visible enthusiasm."^' This was because of threats to European agricultural
subsidies that were sure to be a major topic of the talks. Japan favored a new
round, not because of a desire for reduced trade restrictions, but instead because
they would be "...long and complex and might divert attention from its bilateral
trade tensions. "^^ Developing country's positions varied, ranging from doubts
about a round's prospects to complete opposition to new talks. Since the rounds
began the above attitudes have changed little.
The complexity of the negotiations also created problems from the start.
Originally, 15 separate negotiating groups were insisted upon. Though the 15
were reduced in April 1991 to seven, complexity and functional linkages between
issue areas has made consensus across the negotiating groups difficult.^^
Disagreements over agriculture between the U.S. and the EC stalled
Montreal negotiations of the round in 1988. Despite the appearance of resolution,
similar problems stalled negotiations in December 1990. This time the talks broke
down completely as the EC, Japan and Korea refused to concede their posihon
on agricultural export subsidy reform.^** American negotiators walked out.
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Talks were resumed in March 1991 as a result of an understanding among
key negotiators (including the EC). The understanding, engineered by Director
General Arthur Dunkel, mandated that "...critical agricultural issues would be
addressed explicitly and with reasonable flexibility."^'^ It also confirmed that
trade in textiles that had moved outside of the multilateral framework would be
gradually returned to GATT control. Finally, it agreed that other areas, such as
tariff reduction, intellectual property protection, dispute settlement mechanisms,
trade related investment, and services regulations were to be discussed. The spirit
of compromise did not last long, and the old acrimony over agricultural (and
other) issues quickly resumed.
Another Dunkel sponsored compromise draft, this one submitted on 20
December 1991, received "lukewarm response. "^° Key actors, the EC, the U.S.,
and Japan rejected the proposal, once again primarily over disagreements on
agricultural issues. Since the January 1992 rejection of the Dunkel proposal the
talks have been essentially in stalemate.
A flurry of activity in April, May, and October 1992 proved to be insufficient
to complete the round. The April-May activity occurred when EC consensus
allowed a proposal to reduce agricultural subsidies brief life and the U.S.
responded with signals of increasing flexibility. Unfortunatelv, this initiative
resulted in no substantial action by either side."^ The October activity appears
to have been initiated by a European consensus on the acceptance of subsidized
agricultural export tonnage reduchons, the elimination oi direct subsidies to
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farmers, and breakthroughs in the critical area of financial services/'
Unfortunately, the European concessions still did not go far enough to achieve
agreement, leavmg agriculture as the key sticking point.
Because of the exisring stalemate, an agreement that will meet GATT
deadlines and conclude the Uruguay Round this year, while not impossible,
remains unlikely. Further, the ultimate success of the round is in grave doubt.
Much more likely is continued stalemate, primarily over agriculture.
H. SPECIFIC ISSUE AREAS
Why have agricultural issues been so controversial? Anthony Rowley of the
Far Eastern Economic Review states that attenhon has focused on agricultural
issues during the Uruguay Round because of the "...trade-distorting elements of
the $300 billion U.S. dollars a year which governments worldwide pay to farmers
by way subsidies and supports... "^^ In purely economic terms such subsides
promote economic inefficiency in some farmers while allowing more efficient
producers to gain large economic rents. Subsidy funding is supported by
artificially high consumer prices or money from public budgets.
If agricultural subsidies are inefficient why haven't they been eliminated?
Agricultural subsidies persist precisely because of the economic inefficiencies
discussed above. The political lobby formed by inefficient producers, particularly
in evidence in the EC and Japan, is sufficient to inhibit attempts at reform by their
representatives. Despite enormous pressure on the EC and Japan from a coalition
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of countries, attempts to achieve reductions in agricultural export subsidies of 90
percent by the year 2000 have failed completely."^
While agreement on agricultural issues (particularly betw^een the U.S. and
the EC) is undoubtedly essential to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, it is, according to Sylvia Ostry of the University of Toronto, "...by no
means sufficient.""' A successful agreement must also address the controversial
issues of regulation of the services trade and trade in intellectual property.
Tremendous problems also exist in these areas.
Services now account for approximately 66 percent of American output and
up 70 percent of American jobs (providing up to $90 billion in annual exports).
Even though these "goods" account for 25 percent of world trade, no international
rules of 'fair play ' exist to govern their exchange."^ Specifically at issue are
appropriate rules for trade in services and full sector coverage for all types of
trade. Because services, particularly financial and telecommunication services, are
likely to form the future infrastructure of the world economy, agreement in these
areas is particularly cnhcal. Interestingly, the U.S. and EC generally agree on
regulations in this area that require services to be subject to MEN rules. Resistance
is primarily coming from developing countries in Asia who, in particular, object
to the opening of their banking service sectors.^ Agreement on this divisive
issue looks almost as difficult to achieve as an agreement in agriculture.
Intellectual property is another major area of disagreement. Worldwide
losses due to inadequate protection of intellectual property rights cost American
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industry alone an estimated $60 billion a year. America and other industrial
countries feel protection of innovator rights to their intellectual property must be
guaranteed by international agreement. Many developing countries, on the other
hand, feel such regulations would stifle their own innovators as well as being
extremely costly to administer. As a result agreement on this area remains
unlikelv as well.
Even if consensus is reached under the Dunkel or a subsequent compromise
agreement on the central issues: agriculture, services, and intellectual property,
the agreement is likely to be a bitter one. The breadth of the gaps between the
positions of key members is so great that required concessions may not play well
to home constituencies. Indeed, European farmers are already protesting proposed
agricultural compromises.'^ Any agreement will face an uphill battle for
ratification in many member countries. As a result, even if negotiators beat
deadlines with an agreement, the likelihood of successful ratification must remain
in serious doubt.
If this is not enough to doom current talks, many other issues, though less
central to the current stagnation of GATT talks, could become controversial
enough to prevent an agreement before the 1993 deadline as well. A few of those
include: safeguard rules, dispute settlement laws, local content rules, tariff
reductions, dumping/anti-dumping regulations, voluntary restraint measures
constraints, sector specific subsidy rules, and textile regulations (particularly the
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integration of the MFA into GAIT). Disagreement in any one of areas could
prevent a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.
I. FUTURE PROBLEM AREAS
Even in the unlikely event that agreement is reached on the above
controversies, and the Uruguay Round of GATT is successfully concluded, the
future of the organization as it stands today is not bright. UnresoKed and
unaddressed problems will continue to dominate the organization, potentially
precluding the successful implementahon of a Uruguay accord. This section will
briefly highlight a few of the more important problem issues for the GATT.
Out of ten broad obstacles facing GATT cited by Aho and Aronson, three
continue to be most important. There is no sign that they will be resolved during
current negotiations.
First, global interdependence, particularly in the financial sector, has
accelerated as a result of the end of the Cold War. This has made both nations
and the international economy more sensitive to actions in domeshc economies
as a whole.*^" GATT, in the Uruguay Round, has been unable to find a forum to
deal with the effects of member domestic economic actions on the international
economy. Until it does, no agreement can be effective enough to ensure GATT's
survival.
Second, declining American economic dominance also causes problems that
have not been addressed by current GATT negotiations. The U.S. no longer has
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the financial ability, even if it has the will, to make the concessions necessary to
maintain its undisputed leadership in GATT.'*^ Yet to date, no other international
actor has come forward to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of American
leadership.
A related problem, which economist Jagdish Bhagwati calls the "diminished
giant syndrome," involves the psychological need of America to dominate world
trade coupled with the financial inability to do so. The resulting "trade panic" on
the part of America leads to protectionist trends in the U.S. that GATT has been
unable to handle.*^ '
Third, the breakdown of sectoral distinctions between markets and
agreement areas is redefining international trade. Aho and Aronson cite the
example of financial supermarkets replacing separate banking, brokerage, and
insurance industries. **^^ This problem is particularly acute in burgeoning service
sectors but similar effects can be found in other industries (including
telecommunications and computers) as international corporate structures evolve.
Sectoral merging has, and will continue to create enormous difficulties for GATT
in the regulation of international trade. However, at least partially because the
evolution is an ongoing process, it has been addressed only on the most
superficial level by GATT.
Other problems are also important. The failure of GATT to link trade rules
and policies to environmental issues, its inability to proceed with reforms at a
faster pace than that of its most reluctant member (the convoy problem), and
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problems with the regulation of the growing high technology sector (among
others) are just four examples of vital issues not currently being fully addressed
by GATT."^
The most important issue that the Uruguay Round is failing to adequately
consider is that of institutional reform. As previously stated, the GATT has been
unable to fully apply the mandates of the Tokyo Round which ended in 1979.
Though dispute settlement mechanisms might be strengthened as a result of the
Uruguay Round (if it is successful), without greater enforcement power for GATT
institutions such reform is irrelevant.^^' If not addressed within GATT, this failing
will allow protectionist actions on the margins of GATT to go unchecked in the
future.** Unfortunately, the granting to GATT inshtuhons oi greater enforcement
power does not seem to be a priority of this round. Even if it was made a
priority, agreement would be unlikely due to member state's overriding concerns
about conceding vital elements of national sovereignty. This issue alone is quite
capable of damaging the GATT beyond repair.
Some feel that unless the GATT is comprehensively reformed to resemble
a more powerful and comprehensive World Trading Organization (WTO) that any
agreement achieved under the GATT would be unenforceable."*" Others simply
echo Clyde Prestowitz, who states, "the Uruguay Round was never likely to cure
the ills of the world trading system" because, "...few nahons would obtain
significant concrete benefits."®* Regardless of which line of thought a reader
supports, the question of success in the Uruguay Round becomes moot. Clearly,
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GATT, as it stands, is not capable of taking the regulatory actions necessary to
ensure stability and growth in world trade. The new question must be, are there
plausible alternatives to the GATT?
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III. A GATT ALTERNATIVE: REGIONAL FREE TRADE AREAS
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have been in existence during the enhre post-WW
II period. As previously mentioned, these associations were effectiveiv authorized
under the auspices of GATT article 24. This article allowed the formation of a
single customs territory where:
"all tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce as between the
territories of members of the union are substanhally eliminated and
substantially the same tariffs and other regulations of commerce are applied
by each of the members of the union to the trade territories not included in
the union. '"^'^
Over the years, many have been organized, all with varying degrees of
effectiveness, stamina, and solidarity.
Currently, only three regions have the recognizably continuous levels of
unity and activity necessary to reasonably be identified as FTAs. These three, the
EC, the proposed North American Free Trade Area (NTTA), and the Association
of Southeast Asian Trading Nations (ASEAN), may well, in the future, form the
core of the international trading system. The chief problem for the U.S. is to
determine what effect these regional actors will have on the American economy.
To determine the economic effects of the above trading areas on America
the forms and functions of the three actors must be clear. This chapter will briefly
examine each FTA in terms of the historical conditions of its formation, its recent
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evolution, and its plausible future. By doing so, the area's potential future roles
with respect to the U.S. may begin to be determined.
A. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The European Community is arguably the oldest and most successful FTA
in existence. This section will briefly examine the EC in terms of its historical
development, its current status, and its prospects for the future. By doing so, the
evolution of the EC as the first and most firmly established modern FTA can be
demonstrated.
1. EC Development and Current Status
In the aftermath of WW II the Marshall Plan was implemented by the
U.S. to aid in European reconstruction. As part of that plan America, in the late
1940s, supported efforts by key European leaders to form a customs union.'^"
American encouragement gave impetus to a growing European consensus
supporting relaxation of trade restrictions. With this support, preliminary
discussions on economic cooperation began during the July 1948 Paris meetings
between European leaders. The process was given further momentum by the May
1950 proposal of French foreign minister Robert Schuman calling for sector
specific trade cooperation. This proposal led to the establishment of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), with six original European signatories.'^'
According to career foreign service officer Fierbert Weiner the ECSC
structure was a first step in "... realizing the vision of Europe-wide
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cooperation. "^^ Clearly, the ECSC was the nucleus of an effective FTA that
continues to grow today.
The formation of the ECSC led directly to the creation of the European
Economic Community (EEC) in the late 1950s. By 1955, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg had proposed a common market covering all trade as a
replacement for the sector specific ECSC. This proposal rapidly gained support
throughout Europe and resulted in the "Treaty of Rome" signed in March 1957 by
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The
treaty, implemented on 1 January 1958, firmly established the fledgling European
Community.
' Notably absent from the community process were Britain, Denmark,
and a few other countries. These nations excluded themsehes from membership,
preferring instead to join another organization, the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) which espoused less comprehensive trade cooperation."^^
Britain was not to join the EEC until much later and full EFTA member
integration into the European Community (EC) is still continuing. '^*
The signatories of the Treaty of Rome agreed on two major objectives
under treaty auspices. First, they agreed to pursue the formation of a common
free trade area through the removal of tariffs, the elimination of quantitative
restrictions, and the control of non-tariff barriers to trade by 1970."^' Second, the
treaty set the goal of establishing relationships to promote the free movement of
services, people, and capital through the community. The specific methodology
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to be used in the accomplishment of the broad goals above was left open to
further negotiation. The resulting disagreements between members over details
of methodology is at the root of problems that continue to plague the community
to some degree.
Despite vagueness in the area of specific methodology the treaty did
create infrastructure necessary to begin the trade liberalization inherent in an FTA
concept. This infrastructure, in fact, went beyond the notion of a customs umon
to establish institutional mechanisms such as executive bodies and a community
judicial system which were later to prove essential to the continuing vitality of the
organization.
The structure's effectiveness speaks for itself. EC trade soon grew twice
as fast as trade in the rest of the international economy, quadrupling m the first
decade after 1958.'^
By the late 1960s the FTA that exists today was virtually complete.
Despite some conflict, particularly with the French, critical common agricultural
policy had been established for most commodities by 1966. Common agricultural
policy was to be completely established by 1968.'^^ Further, by July 1968, tariff
and quota restrictions on internal community trade had been eliminated and a
common external tariff was in place (18 months ahead of schedule). Finally,
tentative steps were being taken toward monetary union. The "Triffen" proposal
advocated a single European currency controlled by a European monetary
authority.^ Though creation of monetary integration would place the EC a step
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beyond most conceptions of a simple FTA, that this proposal was made at all
shows the depth, even at this early stage, of European sentiment concerning
integration. A European FTA was on track and ahead of schedule.
Despite a period of stagflation world-wide during the 1970s, and some
internal problems with inflahon and deficit growth, the EC continued to grow.
Nations that had not been original signatories, including the United Kingdom
(critical to a viable future for an EC FTA), either joined or seriously began to seek
membership in the community. ^"^ By 1991 membership had grown to include
12 countries, with more seeking to join (list of membership in Appendix D).
Also during the 1970s, the community undertook steps aimed at
strengthening both its policies and institutions. Treaties amending budgetary
procedures were adopted in 1970 and 1975. These treahes clarified both the
budgeting process and organizational relationships between internal EC
institutions. '°' Additionally, initial foreign policy cooperation (on a limited basis)
under the auspices of European Political Co-operation (EPC) was initiated, the
European Council was institutionalized, cooperative association was resolved with
the EFTA, and the 1975 Lome Convention was signed to provide a de-facto
support system for former EC colonies (primarily French). Finally, despite the
failure of similar proposals in 1970, 1972, and 1975, a European Monetary System
(EMS) was established by agreement in 1979. ^'^•^ With the European Currency
Unit (ECU) as its base, this system's aim was (and remains) to create monetary
stability.''^
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The changes made during the 1970s, though in some cases relatively
minor (with regard to their effect on the global trading system), were to be the
foundation of further significant integration during the 1980s. The 1980s saw the
EC take steps to reform problem areas. Major budgetary and agricultural policy
reform was undertaken because soaring agricultural export subsidy and storage
costs forced a budgetary crisis. A reform package, accepted by the Council in
1988, relied on price discipline and structural reform to restore efficiency to the
faltering agricultural support system. ^°^
Most important during the 1980s were the further steps taken toward
community integration. These steps have been construed by some as the opening
salvos of a trade war and the development of a hostile regional trading bloc (RTB)
based in the European Community.
The 1984 draft treaty for European Union strongly stated the case for
increased federalization of the EC.^°' Such an agreement might well have moved
Europe far beyond a simple FTA structure toward complete unity politically. The
arrival of federation-oriented Jaques Delors as president of the European
Commission in 1985 gave further impetus to this movement. ^°^
The watershed event in the move toward federation of the EC came
with the 1985 publication of a community "white paper" containing the plan to
complete an internal market by 1992. This document, says National Planning
Association fellow Michael Calingaert,
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...brought together for the first time a comprehensive listing of the measures
deemed necessary for achieving the goal of a smgle mtegrated market and
included a timetable for action on each individual measure, with the entire
process scheduled for completion by the end of 1992.'''"
The offspring Single European Act (SEA), used the white paper timetable and
improved elements of the 1984 draft treaty to provide an improved compromise
proposal. That proposal was signed in 1987 at Maastricht, the Netherlands.
Implementation was given momentum by the 1988 Delors Commission three-
phased integrahon process proposal. ''^^ The goal for implementation has been
set for January 1993. A second Maastricht agreement, signed in December 1991,
proposes a single currency under a European monetary system (essentially
pegged to the German mark) and further polihcal integration.'*^
The size of the community and the potential commercial advantages of
integration give powerful stimulus to the integration movement. The community,
with the addition of the EFTA, would have a Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
ranking among the largest in the world (behind the U.S.) and contain more than
380 million consumers (Table IV).
TABLE IV.
COUNIRY/AREA







Sources: Averaged data based on conflicting sources from International ^Aarketln(^ Data and Statistics 1992, 16th
ed., (London Euromonitor, 1992), and North America: The New Competitive Space (New York The Conference
Board, 1991)
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It is also worthy of note that as long ago as 1988 the EC accounted for nearly a
quarter of world trade (40 percent if intra-EC trade is included)."^' Most
importantly, though still a point of contention, a recent European Commission
analysis (the Cecchini Report) predicts five to six percent regional GDP growth
as a result of the single European market."'
The implementation of the second Maastricht treaty would, in essence,
move Europe beyond a common market to full economic union. This proposal,
however, remains in deep trouble. Because of the fear that monetary and political
unity could lead to losses of sovereignty and national identity, Danish voters
narrowly rejected the treaty in June 1992. Voting was extremely close with
percentages of 50.7 to 49.3 percent.''' Addihonally, though the referendum
narrowly won a September referendum in France, it remains threatened by
enormous dissent in England. Here also, serious debate has centered on the
public's dissatisfaction with a proposed common monetary system and potenhal
losses of national sovereignty that could occur under the treaty.
Despite problems with this second Maastricht treaty, the SEA, which
concerns only market integration, is almost certain to be implemented on
schedule. However, whether or not the goal of full integration is met by the EC
remains to be seen.
Whatever happens, the future of the EC continues to be the subject of
intense debate. Strangely, the debate is largely centered within the European
community between factions favoring (or opposed to) increased federalization.
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International protest, which could be expected if hoshle trading bloc development
was deemed an issue, has been minimal. Xevertheless, the process of European
mtegration has tremendous importance for the further development of North
American and Asian FTAs.
Will the failure to ratify the EC 92 agreement spell the end of the
European Community as an FTA? What does the future hold for the EC^ These
are the questions to be answered by the next sub-section.
2. EC Futures
The future of the Maastricht treaty is difficult to predict. Political
analyst Alan Riding has recently stated that "The issues are so complex that
ordinary people seem baffled. ""^^ The complexity of the agreement generates
suspicion in many Europeans minds. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the
future of a united Europe "...is being argued behind closed doors by a small
number of officials..." and with little input from ordinary citizens.""* Clearly, full
European monetary and political integration is not certain.
In addition, long-term obstacles to integration still exist. Despite
increasing European homogeneity, differences in the areas of culture, language,
and tradition still separate European nations. Other, more concrete differences
exist in the areas of tariff regulations, dumping/origin rules, quotas, standards,
and other trade issues. These will not go away or be resolved quickly. As a result,
further integration may be a slow process.
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Regardless of the problems and the relatively slow pace of integration,
levels of EC integration are expected to continue to grow. Experts on international
trade from many backgrounds support this view. College of Europe professor
John Finder notes:
There is no such thing as automatic spillover or inevitable progress toward
federation. But given the continued growth of interdependence in the real
economies of the member countries, the strength of the political commitment
to further unificarion, the existence of solid community structures on which
further integration can be based, and the dynamism that the community has
shown since 1985, further development of the community's competences and
institutions appears likely."'
Italian merchant banker Leanardo Chanez agrees and states that "European unity
is already happening despite the slow pace of the bureaucrats.""^
The above view can be lent credence by the examination of three
decades of EC integration. Analyzing trends in intra-EC and extra-EC trade for
the last three decades, economist Jeffrey J. Schott concluded that, "the growth of
intra-EC trade has far outpaced the growth of exports to third markets."""
Michael Calingaert thus appropriately argues that "...the question is not whether
the European Community will move toward a single market, but rather how far
and how quickly.""® The continued existence, and further integration of the
European Community appears inevitable.
But what if, in some unforseen scenario, integration irrevocably stalls?
Will the European FTA then cease to exist? Will the FTA cease to be a potent
force in world trade? The last two questions can be answered with a simple no.
If the community integration process stalls the EC will not cease to exist. The FTA
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will survive no matter what the fate of the federalization effort. Further, it will
continue to be a potent force in world trade. This issue here, as with the other
two FTAs we shall explore, is not whether or not such blocs will form. Integration
instead, is simply a matter of degree, of more or less free trade within each bloc,
more or less levels of federalism within each bloc, and more or less protectionist
practices in external trade on the part of each area. This is the essence of the FTA
question.
In conclusion, full monetary and political integration may or may not
be inevitable in the EC. However, most experts in the field agree with political
analyst and trade correspondent Craig R. Whitney, who argues that if the process
stalls, if the treaty dies a quiet death, then the EC would simply be left to
"...become the giant free-trade bloc of sovereign states that the member countries
had already planned before the Maastricht accord.""'^
Thus, it is appropriate to acknowledge, for policymaking purposes, that
the perceived benefits of the EC FTA are too attractive to allow its disintegration.
Europeans have come to rely on the large internal market and improved services
made possible by the EC. As a consequence, the EC will retain its powerful
influence on world trade and its survival will continue to encourage the
development of FTAs in other regions.
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B. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA
This section will explore the second most active FTA formation process m
existence today, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). This potential
FTA is currently anticipated to include the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.''^ In examining the potential NAFTA this section will illustrate that a
free trade pact between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico is ultimately inevitable
simply because it is in each national actor's long-term best interest.
Initially, the discussion will focus very briefly on historical issues affecting
the debate, including historical milestones in U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada trade
relations. Then, to predict the future of the NAFTA agreement, an examination
will be made of the agreement's basic structure and the likelihood of successful
agreement completion. By examining these issues, the economically necessary
NAFTA can be demonstrated to be assured of ratification in all three negotiating
countries, resulting in the implementation of a North American trade alliance for
Mexico, Canada, and the United States.
Free trade under the auspices of NAFTA, considered by many to be a
necessity for long term North American economic growth, has long been the
subject of debate at all levels of the American, Canadian, and Mexican
policymaking process. If current debate is resolved in favor of free trade
proponents, the resulting market would easily rival the unified EC and EFTA
market in collective GNP. To illustrate the size of such a market, consider the
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combined 1989 GDP of $5,914 billion for North America (see Table V) as
compared to a significantly smaller GDP of $4,145 billion for the EC.
TABLE V.





United States 5,163,200 2.5%
Canada 550,354 3.0%
Mexico 200,712 3.0%
Total 5,914,000 2.8% (avg)
Sources: International Marketing Data and Statistics 1992 (London: Euromonitor, 1992) and World Development
Report 1991: The Challenge of Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for The World Bank, 1991).
Based on the trends above, NFTA might well compete favorably in global markets
with the unified EC.'^^
1. The U.S.-Mexico Relationship
Historically, the participation of America in the Mexican economy has
often been characterized by policies of blatant interventionism in Mexican affairs.
These American policies, for many years, shaped Mexico's attitude toward the
United States, giving Mexico a fierce determination to ensure economic autonomy
was retained.
The first sign of a thaw in Mexico-U.S. trade relations came with the
Mexican establishment, in the late 1960s, of the Maquiladora concept. The
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Maquiladora structure was defined by Mexico as industrial locations with up to
100 percent foreign ownership, producing finished goods (largely for export) from
imported components.^" These industries rapidly became highly profitable for
both Mexico and the United States. Initially only authorized in near-border areas,
Maquiladoras are now spread throughout Mexico.
By the 1970s Mexico was the third ranking U.S. trading partner and the
deepened U.S.-Mexico relationship continued to grow. In 1986, partially as a
result of a 1982 debt crisis and resulting pressure from the U.S., Mexico, with
America's help, successfully lobbied to join the GATT structure, thereby
internationalizing their trading role.
By 1987, Mexico had signed the U.S. /Mexico Framework Agreement,
establishing an initial mechanism to discuss and resolve trade issues through
"working group" negotiations in most economic sectors. '^"^ The Framework
Agreement, together with recent reforms implemented by President Carlos Salinas
De Gottari have formed the underpinnings of improved collaboration on trade
issues between the U.S. and Mexico.^'^^
The results speak for themselves. U.S. trade with Mexico has doubled
since 1986 ($59 billion in 1990).^^^ At least 264,000 jobs have been created. '-'
Average tariff rates have also been reduced (from 28.5 percent in 1985 to 11.8
percent by 1987 and still further to 9 percent by March 1991).''^ Most
importantly, levels of interdependence have been increased and the basis of
cooperation necessary for a free trade agreement have been set.
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2. The U.S.-Canada Relationship
According to economist Maureen A. Farrow and policy analyst Robert
C. York, the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement had its "roots" deep in their mutual
economic history, "...beginning with the Reciprocity Treaty of 1874."'-'^ A
relatively close relationship has continued since, highlighted by free trade
agreements in agricultural equipment (1944) and automotive products (1965).
Economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott concur, particularly noting
the 1965 Auto Pact as the modern "foundation stone" of a gradual and continuing
process of North American economic integration.''^^
Canadian-U.S. integration has been, over the years, an evolutionary
process based on gradually increasing levels of interdependence. As such, at least
within the United States, the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement generated
relahvely little debate during its negotiation and approval phases. Members of the
U.S. Congress, in particular, seemed relatively indifferent to the negohations
process. '^'^ This may have been, in part, due to the perceived equalitv between
U.S. and Canadian economies. It may also have been partially due to a more
limited role played by Congress in trade issues prior to the end of the "Cold
War."
Another important reason for lack of American congressional opposition
to the U.S.-Canada agreement may have significant bearing on current XAFTA
negotiations. The lack of debate in Congress may have been due to reluctance on
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the part of American congressmen, when confronted with a decision on the issue
of free trade, to go on the record as a "protectionist. " The same reluctance to
demonstrate protectionist behavior might be a large factor limiting negative U.S.
congressional action in the NAFTA ratification process. This could be a deciding
factor in agreement implementation.
Opposition to the agreement, in the U.S., was centered in the states who
anticipated negative effects on home industries. Protest to the agreement rallied
around these states' congressmen. The result was isolated and essentially
ineffective opposition to the agreement. Unified support for the agreement was
primarily generated by the executive branch, the National Governor's Conference,
business groups, and key congressmen such as Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D TX) and
Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D IL).'^^
As previously noted, however, discussions in Congress were generally
non-combative, being centered on job losses and specific industry concerns. When
the bill was formally introduced, it quickly passed in both chambers. ^''^ Similar
trends in support may be readily seen in the ongoing NAFTA debate.
Interestingly, the bill met with major public debate in Canada and
became the primary campaign issue for Prime Minister Mulroney's conservative
party. Mr. Mulroney was narrowly reelected and subsequently pushed the bill
through Commons just days before planned implementation on 1 January 1989.
The reason for this difficulty seemed to be fear of the U.S. economic might
overwhelming a smaller Canadian economy and increasing levels of American
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protectionism.^-'^ If Canadian fears of combined U.S.-Mexico economic strength
parallel those of the U.S.-Canada free trade negotiations, they may also be
significant but should not be sufficient to prevent a NAFTA agreement.
Many of the mechanics of the Canada-U.S. agreement parallel those
which may be expected in the NAFTA (see Appendix E for specifics). In
particular, a strong arbitration commission can be expected to be an essential part
of any NAFTA agreement.
Quanhtative estimates of the results of the U.S.-Canada Free trade
agreement are premature because the 10 year phase in process is incomplete.
Preliminary results, however, indicate that the agreement is contributing to
increased trade.
Levels of trade in 1990 were $84 bilHon, an 18 percent increase in the
first year of operation. ^"^ Further, the agreement has, according to Farrow and
York, allowed Canada to realize economies of scale and specialization thus
"rationalizing its production" and becoming "...more competitive in an increasingly
comperitive international marketplace."^^'
Though some Canadian critics blame the free trade agreement for
economic ills associated with the recession of the last two years, most economists
disagree. Noted economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott recently
stated that much of this criticism is "exaggerated and misplaced" reflecting
sovereignty concerns, discomfort with the prospect of structural adjustments, and
uneasiness with the implications of structural adjustments for expensive public
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programs. ^^^ Trade correspondent Clyde H. Farnsworth fundamentally agrees,
citing the $200 billion in trade between the two countries in 1991 (the greatest
volume between any two countries in the world) as proof that the pact has been
beneficial to both sides.'''" Most experts feel that the benefits of the above
agreement would also translate to a broader NAFTA agreement.
3. Potential NAFTA Structure, Benefits, and Prospects
Mexico-U.S. trade relations have been continuously improving for two
decades. The Canada-U.S. free trade agreement appears to be a clear success.
These factors, combined with the growth of regionalism globally, are in the
process of combining to make the ratification of a free trade agreement covering
all of North America highly likely. This section will examine the basic structure
of a potential NAFTA agreement, its expected benefits, and its current prospects
for ratification.
In May 1990 Mexican President Salinas called for the creation of a U.S.-
Mexico free trade agreement with the overwhelming support of the Mexican
Senate. '^^ Soon after, in June of 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas jointly
announced their intentions to pursue an agreement. ^^^ A formal request from
President Salinas followed and President Bush notified Congress of his intent to
negotiate on 25 September 1990.^'*° Subsequent to a formal request by Canada
for inclusion in the talks. President Bush, President Salinas, and Prime Minister
Mulroney announced joint talks on the proposed NAFTA agreement on 5
February 1991.^'*^ After seven negotiating rounds, on 12 August 1992, a NAFTA
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Accord was initialed by all three negotiating parties and submitted to their
respective legislatures for ratification/^
The intention of NAFTA negotiahons has been to make the agreement
profitable to all three countries while providing general adherence to GATT
Article 24 guidelines. To that end, talks in nineteen NAFTA negotiating groups
centered on the phased reduction and ultimate elimination of tariffs in all three
countries. They have also addressed non-tariff barriers such as licensing, quotas,
subsidies, and barriers to investment flow. Other, secondary (but shll significant)
issues included services, intellectual property rights, government procurement
policies, standards /certifications testing, customs requirements, rules of origin,
entry/exit restrictions, narcotics, immigration, human rights, energy issues, and
the environment.
The key element of the resulting NAFTA plan is the elimination oi
customs duties on "tens of thousands of items," over periods of up to 15
years.''*'* Other important provisions liberalize trade relationships in the areas
of advertising, agriculture, autos, banking, energy, the environment, food safety,
government contracts, insurance, securities, work visas, textiles, and trucking.
Dispute settlement procedures were also constructed.
National objectives in the NAFTA agreement vary from country to
country (see Appendix F) and perceived benefits vary with the background of the
supporter and their specific agenda. Some prevailing positions are, however, clear.
Analysts William J. Holstein and Amy Borrus report that, in general; "...the largest
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companies in ail tliree countries favor a continental free-trade zone..." while
"...labor unions, smaller companies, and less efficient industries are lobbying
against it."^""
Regional and congressional lobbying by state and local governments is
also providing a great deal of support for the NAFTA agreement. Cross-border
associations of such actors are capable of exerting tremendous pressure on
policymakers to support free trade. ''^^
Undoubtedly, both sides of the debate make certain valid points,
particularly if a micro-economic focus is taken. Nevertheless, for all three nations,
serious analysis shows that any losses produced by NAFTA implementation
should be more than offset by greater long-run economic efficiency.
That a NAFTA would have at least two key benefits now seems
generally accepted. First, economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffery J. Schott
have given credibility to the hypothesis that a NAFTA would promote the
efficient use of natural and human resources throughout the region. Using a
historical approach dubbed the "HE model," Hufbauer and Schott have found,
based on a detailed analysis, generally positive benefits associated with a
NAFTA. '^^ Though the magnitudes of gains and losses showed some variability,
not only the HE but six other existing models, when compared, supported the
notion that a NAFTA would increase economic efficiency and generally benefit
all three participants.^"*^ The HE model specifically forecasts that a NAFTA
(together with continued Mexican reform), would by 1995, generate an extra $16.7
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billion in U.S. and $200 million in Canadian exports while creating 600,000
Mexican and 325,00 U.S. jobs.'-***
Several other studies generally supported the Hufbauer and Schott
results. These studies found that less dramatic, but generally positi\e results
could be expected for all countries in a NAFTA. '^'^
Second, it is quite probable that the NAFTA would insure all three
nations against sudden changes in trade policy that could lead to increased
discrimination or protectionism in the region. Though this hypothesis is, as yet,
unproven, an examination of the stability enhancing effects of other international
organizations would likely lend the idea credibility.
''
In the long term all evidence points to an increase in value added jobs
as exports increase. Further, as stated, overall employment levels will increase.
The movement oi low skill final manufacturing to Mexico will improve o\erall
North American competihveness in world markets. This, in turn, should help
preclude movement of industry to locahons with lower labor costs (like Asia).
Finally, such a scenario will also result in a growth of demand for skilled
American or Canadian labor to produce complex components for final assembly
in Mexico. ^'°
The benefits of a NAFTA, combined with the solid determination of
United States and Mexico to achieve agreement have added strong impetus to the
NAFTA movement. Canada, forced to participate (if for no other reason because
of their unwillingness to be left out), has simply cooperated.
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The concessions made by President Bush in his May 1991 "Action Plan"
gave significant impetus to the negotiating process. This plan assuaged key
concerns of American and Canadian legislators and made crihcal concessions on
central opposition issues at a polihcally appropriate time. By supporhng
associated gradual tariff reductions, tough rules of origin, worker
retraining /dislocation assistance, labor standards, maintenance of immigration
standards, and strict environmental regulations President Bush silenced key
domestic American opposition to NAFTA. ''^ The Bush concessions may have
relaxed considerable Canadian opposihon as well. These actions undoubtedly
played a major part in the successful conclusion to negotiations in August 1992.
Significant progress towards a viable NAFTA has been made.
Compromises have been reached in critical areas and all three chief negotiators,
Carla Hills (U.S.), Michael H. Wilson (Canada), and Jaime Serra Puche (Mexico)
have indicated by their endorsement that they are satisfied with the result.
Mexico, in particular, has embraced the accord. '^^
Despite the progress, American and Canadian domestic polihcal
concerns may prevent ratification of a NAFTA agreement this year. In the both
the U.S. and Canada, this is because of the agreement's importance as campaign
issue in the reelection bids of President Bush and Prime Minister Mulroney.''"*
Long term prospects look better. President Bush has often reaffirmed
his commitment to the NAFTA. Presidential candidate Bill Clinton has also been
a consistent NAFTA supporter. Though election year politics and pressure from
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organized labor may prevent Mr. Clinton's vocal support prior to the election, the
probability of his long term support for a North American free trade agreement
IS high (based on his record in Congress). Since the agreement cannot realistically
come to a vote before the November election, it is probable that no matter which
candidate is in the White House in January, support for a NAFTA will be
ensured.''^
In Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney faces a significant battle for
ratification of NAFTA. However, he has been a successful crusader for free trade
before (during the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. FTA in 1989). As the position
of Mulroney's conservative party remains strong, it is likely he will succeed in the
ratification process again.'"
The treatment of the FTA issue by the U.S. Congress is more
problematical. Delay in ratification of a completed NAFTA agreement by an
American Congress, afraid of alienating labor in an election year, is certain. This
may, however, provide no more than a temporary impediment to ftnal FTA treaty
ratification. Even those Democratic congressmen currentiy speaking out against
the agreement do not actually condemn a NAFTA. Rather, like Senator Max S.
Bacus (D MT) and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D TX), they condemn either the
manuverings of the Republican administration in submitting the agreement
during an election year, shortcomings in worker retaining programs, or flaws in
border environmental cleanup requirements.'"^ They do not condemn the
agreement or argue against its necessity. Senator Bentsen, in fact, acknowledges
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the bipartisan majority in Congress favoring free trade. ' Given the eagerness
of the administration and business, together with America's free trade orientation,
it is unlikely that current congressional reluctance will do more than delay
agreement. Some form of NAFTA will almost certainly be approved.
Mexican President Salinas may have been correct when he recently
stated that the agreement is "inevitable. "''** NAFTA ratification is likely.
Still, just as in the case of the EC one must ask, what if, for any reason,
the agreement fails? What will then be the progress of North American free trade?
Most analysts believe that linkages between the North American countries will
continue to grow whether or not NAFTA goes through.^''^ Sidney Weintraub,
the premier thinker in the area of North American trade relahons, has generally
agreed; noting in the particular case of U.S.-Mexican integration that "...the
industrial strategies in the two countries are not completely separable. .."^^"
Thus, because of growing North American economic interdependence,
continuing cultural links, and geographic contiguity. North American trading
relationships will become both broader and deeper. As a result, regional linkages
will grow. A regional trading area is the most likely result. It is wise, then, to
formulate American economic policy based on the existence of a North American
FTA. Once again, as in the case of the EC, the difference between alternatives may
be only a matter of the length of time it takes to come to terms, the depth of trade
liberalization, and the extent of any externally protectionist behavior.
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As a consequence of the existence of the two potential FTAs discussed
above, the EC and NAFTA, industrialized countries in Asia are likely to continue
their move toward the development of an Asian FTA as a simple matter of
survival. With that in mind, the future of free trade in Asia will now be brieflv
considered.
C THE ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA
This section will examine the third large free trading area now in its
formahve stages. Though clearly the most tenuous of the three FTAs discussed,
this FTA, known as the Asian Free Trade Area, appears to be coalescing around
the leadership of the developing nations that are members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group.
The emerging Asian FTA will be examined, as the EC and NAFTA have
been previously, in terms of its historical development and its current status.
Since the Asian FTA proposal originated with ASEAN, the majority of the section
will be devoted to ASEAN's role in the developmental process.'"' However,
because of the continuing strong influence of the newly industrialized Asian
economies (Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan) and Japan as regional actors,
those nation's roles in a future Asian FTA will also be briefly explored.'"' The
analysis of these issues will illustrate that though further development of an
Asian FTA is not certain, it is more likely than not.
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An Asian FTA centered in ASEAN would have a potential market of at least
330 million increasingly wealthy consumers. Based on size alone it could wield
tremendous economic influence in the global economy. ^^^^ More importantly,
with an average regional growth rate in the neighborhood of six to seven percent,
the area has great potential for the economic influence in the future.'*^ It might,
in fact, become an influential third leg of a future global triad of trading
communities. ^''^
The potential Asian FTA currently includes the ASEAN members Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei under the umbrella of
the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) agreement. A fully integrated organization consisting
solely of these nations would potentially have relatively impressive economic
might (Table VI).
If, as is likely, the AFTA was joined by other wealthy Asian nations, the
results would be more dramahc. Realistic candidates would include the newly
industrialized economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan Table
(VII). Due to the magnitude of these nations' output, such integration would














AFTA Total 277,564 7.8"..
(average)
"1988 eshmate only No other information available
Sources: International Marketing Data and Statistics 1992, 16th edihon (London: Euromonitor, 1992), World
Development Report 1991: Tlie Oiallenge of Development, Tlie Economist Book of Vital World Statistics (London:
Random House, 1992), and Economic Report 1991/1992 (Malaysian Ministry of Finance, 1992).
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AFTA Total 277,564 7.8"..
(average)
Hong Kong 62,924 2.3"..
South Korea 212,970 6.2"o
Taiwan 148,205 7.6"'..
AFTA/NIE Total 701,663 6.0%
(average)
Sources- International Marketin<^ Data and Statistics 1992 (London Euromonitor, 1992) and Economic Report
1991/1992 (Malaysian Mmistry of Fmance, 1992).
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1. ASEAN Development
The currently developing Asian Free Trading Area is being spawned
under the umbrella of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN,
conceived in Bangkok in 1967, was intended to replace a relatively ineffective
predecessor, The Association of Southeast Asia, dating from 1961. As formulated
in its founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was intended to:
...accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development
in the region through joint endeavor in the spirit of equality and partnership
in order to strengthen the foundahon for a prosperous and peaceful
community of Southeast Asian nations. ..'^^
The declaration also called for cooperation in "the development of basic
commodities, industrial cooperation (in the form of five large industrial joint
ventures), cooperation in trade, cooperation in international commodity problems,
and a joint approach to other world economic problems. "^^^ Additionally, a
consensus-based decisionmaking process was formalized, allowing the
organization to proceed at the pace of its slowest member.
In spite of its lofty intentions, ASEAN made little progress in its first
decade, except in the development of limited joint regional security goals. Action
in this realm, forced, in part, by concern over conflict in Vietnam and Cambodia,
as well as fear of domination by large external actors (particularly the U.S. and
Japan), provided the general impetus for later cooperation in other venues.
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The first ASEAN summit held in Bali in 1976 was considered by many
observers to "mark the emergence of ASEAN as a functioning institution. "'^'^ The
summit produced two treaties, the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
and the Declaration ofASEAN Concord, respectively intended to promote a general
framework for member relations and greater economic cooperation.'^*^ More
concrete accomplishments included a call for regional joint ventures among
private firms, promotion of intra-regional trade through preferential trading
agreements, and the creation of an ASEAN Finance Corporation.
Despite the perceived success of the 1976 (Bali) and 1987 (Manila)
summits, progress in increasing levels of ASEAN economic cooperation have,
until recently, remained weak. ASEAN preferential trading agreements, intended
to be operationalized in the form of reduced tariffs, were inihally marred by
micro-management in the form of product-by-product tariff reduction
negotiations. The result was coverage of only five percent of intra-ASEAN trade
by such agreements and resulting low levels of intra regional trade. ^''^ Though
improvements were made in this area at the 1987 Manila summit, the frequency
of tariffs has remained high (about 80 percent). Average tariff rates have also
remained relatively high, at close to 30 percent.^^^ At least one study thus
concludes that past progress in the reduction of tariffs through the program has
been "disappointing."^'''
Also, though seven joint industrial projects were approved in 1976,
progress has been limited in aU but a few.'''^ Relaxation of equity requirements
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negotiated during the 1987 Manila summit failed to generate a hoped for
"breakthrough" in this area.'"* Unfortunately, successful cooperation in the
establishment other cooperative ventures was, to a great extent, overshadowed by
the failure of industrial cooperation.'^'
Economic cooperation in external negotiations was much more effective.
During its first two decades, ASEAN did succeed in acting as a group in
negotiations with Australia (over international civil aviation policy) and with the
European Community (over trade issues). ^"^ Further indication of its reputation
for success in external negotiations can be demonstrated by the acceptance of
ASEAN as a "permanent dialogue partner" in global trade negotiations by the
Organization for Economic Development (OECD).'^
Finally, the importance of "invisible" and "unannounced" areas of ASEAN
cooperation, stressed by noted Asian specialist Lawrence B. Krause of Brookings,
cannot be overemphasized.'^*^ In a region in which business relahonships are
often based on personal ties, ASEAN initiatives have specifically provided
channels which have improved regional business contacts and thus overall
economic cooperation. Organizations such as ASEAN associations of businessmen,
bankers, and professionals as well as the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, for example, have helped establish a basis for future cooperation which
have become increasingly apparent in early 1992.
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2. ASEAN Today
During the January 1992 Singapore summit, the process of developing
ASEAN economic cooperation gained momentum which seems to continue to
grow today. The product of this meetmg. The Singapore Declaration of 1992, set
a new direction for ASEAN economic policy.
^' During the summit, in what some experts argue may have been a
response to European and North American FTA initiatives, ASEAN heads of
government decided to "...further accelerate joint efforts in enhancing intra-
ASEAN cooperation..." by adopting a new framework establishing an "...ASEAN
Free Trade Area.. .within a time frame of 15 years beginning 1 Januarv 1993... '^^^
Using a scheme based on a Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT), this agreement mandates effective tariffs of zero to five percent for 15
major product groups by 1 January 2008.^^° Other summit initiatives agree to
increase levels of intra-regional cooperation and integration in
investment/banking, industrial linkages, transportation, communication and
agriculture (among others). Though the agreement was weakened by a
compromise allowing products to be excluded from individual tariff reductions
(if the member country feels that tariff reduction would cause 'serious injury" to
domestic industries), it remains a major milestone in Asian economic
cooperation.^*'^
Clearly ASEAN, as a result of its 1992 summit declaration, is at a
crossroads in the development of regional economic integration. Does the
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Singapore Declaration, described as a "watershed" by some observers, portend the
formation of a true FTA in Asia? Or is such an agreement simply an empty
political gesture aimed at forestalling FTA development in other regions? These
questions currently remain unanswered. It is clear, however, that three factors are
most likely to promote change in ASEAN. These developments, the growing
interdependence of export sectors, the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI),
and the course of external economic events may have more influence on the
future of an ASEAN FTA than the political factors involved in the evolution of
the Singapore Declaration alone.
First, though ASEAN countries, in particular, have very similar export
sectors (based in part on similar factor endowments), making intra-region trade
highly competitive, there is little doubt that levels of trade integration in Asia as
a whole are increasing. ^*^ A recent study by economist Linda Low of the
University of Singapore study indicates that 1989 intra-Asia-Pacific trade
accounted for 76.6 percent of total trade. More importantly, since 1980, intra-
ASEAN trade had increased by 1.8 times and intra-Asia-Pacific trade by 2.3
times. '*^^
If trade barriers fall as a result of the AFTA declaration, the above
trends will accelerate as formerly domeshc-oriented ASEAN countries exploit
regional economies of scale and increased comparative advantage. At a minimum,
increased levels of intra-regional trade, both within ASEAN and between ASEAN
and the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Flong Kong, Taiwan, and
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South Korea tend to increase regional interdependence and build
personal/professional business relationships. Such trends will provide impetus
for hirther integrarion.
Second, levels of NIE FDI in ASEAX are growing. It some cases, levels
of NIE FDI have increased by over twenty times from 1986 to 1990 alone. '^ This
fact, coupled with a parallel phenomena, the movement of NIE industry to
ASEAN countries by regional multinational corporations (MNCs), will add further
incentive for closer economic cooperation between the NIEs and ASEAN
countries. "^^ These movements can be expected to expand as MNCs look to
domestic and regional markets to service relocated industries. Though such trends
do not guarantee more cooperative ASEAN relations, they will undoubtedly add
to the momentum for closer economic cooperation in the region.
The third factor promoting regional integration does not originate in
ASEAN (or even Asia), instead it originates in the drive toward regional
integration in North America and Europe.
As argued previously, there is a clear trend towards economic
1
regionalism in North America and Europe. Former ambassador to the Philippines,
Stephen W. Bosworth, argues that the of the two, the American decision to
negotiate a NAFTA "...has been particularly disconcerting to Asians" because it
seems to be a signal of the failure of America to provide critical support for free
trade under the GATT system. ^^ Many Asian decisionmakers, reflecting the
unease created by this move, have begun to feel a move toward closer economic
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cooperation in the form of a regional economic grouping is inevitable. ^'^^ This
view is echoed by Jeffrey J. Schott, who argues that potential FTA members, in
general/'... do not regard FTAs as a complement to GATT negotiations, but rather
as a defensive reaction to the threat of protectionism and bilateralism by the
United States."'''^
The formation of FTAs in Europe and North America may thus be a
final determinant of the future of an Asian FTA. Whether or not this is true may
depend on the role of Japan. This nation's pivotal role is thus an appropriate
subject for consideration in our next section.
3. The Role of Japan
The role of Japan in Asia has changed a great deal since the 1974 visit
by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka touched off civil disturbances in ASEAN
countries as a protest against "Japanese encroachment. "^^^ Since 1977 the role of
Japan has been critical to the future of developing Asia.
The initiation of the 'Tukuda Doctrine" in 1977 began a new era in
Japan-ASEAN relations. ^^° Active diplomacy on the part of the Japanese
government encouraged the commitment of capital to the region in the form of
both loans and aid. Despite a 50 percent appreciation in the value of the yen
during the mid-1980s (and the repayment problems that caused smaller Asian
economies), Japan played a major role in ASEAN and the NIEs throughout the
period.
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A "new wave" of Japanese investment in ASEAN actually started in
1986, encouraging the average annual growth rate of Japanese investment to
average over 53 percent per annum from 1896 to 1989.^^^ By 1989 Japanese
investment in ASEAN and the NIEs was up to $7.8 billion, concentrated in labor
and capital-intensive industries producing goods for both export and domestic
markets. Japanese imports of ASEAN products and raw materials have also been
steadily increasing (by 50 percent in 1988).^'^^ Finally, ASEAN and the rest of
developing East Asia remain the focus of Japanese Official Development
Assistance (ODA). Such linkages, particularly as American investment in the
region remains stagnant, cannot but help to promote economic interdependence.
The advent of the ETA phenomena in North America and Europe has
led to a decline in influence in Asia for the industrialized West, making the role
of Japan even more significant. According to Congressional Research Ser\'ice
economist Dick K. Nanto, U.S. and European FTAs "...have provided a unique
opportunity for Japan to gain leadership in Asia at the expense of the Western
industrial powers and for Asian NIEs to rethink their heavy dependence on the
United States. ^^"^ It has also led to fears on the part of Japan of decreased market
access due to increased levels of protectionism in the West.
The result of the above has been to make Japan increasingly desirous
of a role as the voice of developing Asia. Particularly with respect to the NIEs of
Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, Japan has been more and more
vocal. Evidence of this Japanese goal was demonstrated as early as 1988 at the
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Montreal Summit, with a Japanese attempt to "...stake a claim as the voice of NIEs
in Asia."^^'* Proposals for a regional economic group in Asia, with Japan at the
head, have since conhnued.'^^ Most recently this desire was nominally defined
by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during a 1991 Singapore policy speech. In this
speech he proposed that Singapore and Japan should serve as "...the indispensable
tips..." of the "New Crescent of Prosperity" serving to link Northeast Asia, Indo-
China, and ASEAN in the 21st century.^^^
Counterbalancing the above trends, it must be realized that, though
proposals for a Japan-led regional economic grouping have gained some support
in Japan, their support in ASEAN and the NIEs currently does not appear to be
strong. The developing countries of Asia continue to fear exploitation by Japan
in such a grouping. Additionally, memories of Japanese aggression in WW II,
though diminishing as each new generation enters the work-force, are still
present.
The particular disincentives above could rapidly change, however, if
FTAs become institutionalized in the industrial West and GATT fails. In that case,
as Japanese investment in Asia increases and old memories dim, ASEAN and the
NIEs might well feel differently about a Japanese role in an Asian ETA. Though
it is doubtful that Japan would be accepted as the leader of such an FTA, the
simple presence of Japanese economic might would lend enormous weight to the
voice of an Asian FTA in international trade negotiations. In addition, such a
group would have a combined GNP much closer to that of the EC or NAFTA
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(Table VIII), giving the resulting FTA a proportionately greater voice in the
definition of international trading relationships.
TABLE VIII.





Source; International Marketing Data and Statistics 1992, 16th edition (London: Euromonitor, 1992).
4. AFTA Futures
In sum, though ASEAN's ability to promote internal market
liberalization appears to be less than perfect, it has, on several occasions,
demonstrated both assertiveness and cohesion in international negotiations. The
ability to act in a unified manner on international trade issues may be a
determining factor in the future of the FTA. Particularly in a trading system
where American economic hegemony is declining, if current trends continue, Asia
may be feel coerced into the formation of an FTA. If developed, such an Asian
FTA would result in substantial interdependence and increased levels of economic
integration for Pacific Rim nations.
Though the future of an Asian FTA is impossible, at this point, to
accurately predict it appears that the trend in Asia is toward economic integration
72
and regional trade freedom. As a result of the AFTA agreement, Malaysian
economist Mohamed Ariff recently noted:
...trade cooperation has progressed remarkably from the cumbersome item
by item approach, starting with just 71 items in 1976, to across-the-board
tariff cuts involving tens of thousands of items with a formal commitment
and a firm timetable to increase the depth of tariff cuts and shorten the
national exclusion lists.
^'^^
He also notes that:
ASEAN countries have built up a cohesive and strong network for
consultation and co-operation in major economic policy development
without compromising national sovereignty. ''^'^
It is thus appropriate for America to consider policy approaches that
address the effects of an Asian FTA on the United States. Even if no formal FTA
develops, the trend toward Asian regional integration is likely to continue.
Economist Dick K. Nanto summarizes the trend nicely, arguing:
Whether a formal Asian Pacific Bloc is created or not is, in fact, largely
immaterial because a de facto trading bloc is emerging. It is arising out of
economic necessity and will continue to grow regardless of the development
of a formal free trade agreement among the various economies. ..^'^
If an Asian FTA were completed, it could realistically be the third actor
in a global trading system based on a international economic "triad" consisting of
the EC, the NAFTA, and the Asian FTA. The first and most essential question to
be addressed concerning such a triad is: What type of economic effects would
such a system have on the United States? This, the fundamental dilemma facing
future American policymakers, will be the subject of the next section.
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IV. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TRADING BLOCS
The economic effects that the abov^e FTA-based global trading system will
have on the United States are still quite controversial. Because this system has not
yet been fully realized, little hard empirical evidence is available. As a result,
integration phenomena associated with customs union theory must chiefly be
used to predict the future economic impact of the resulting system on America.
Fortunately, customs union theories are highly applicable to the examination of
regional integration in the form of FTAs, because customs unions are simply a
more highly integrated form of FTAs.
Two types of gains and losses, static and dynamic, can be associated with
integration theory. Static effects can be defined as "...those stemming from once-
and-for-all reallocation of an existing stock of capital, labor, and other
resources..."'"'^ Dynamic effects, on the other hand, are "...those associated with
the effects or regional economic integration on productive capacity and potential
output..
."^°^
This section will examine both static and dynamic theories relating to
regional economic relationships, using them and available general empirical
information on regional trade flows to make some elementary predictions as to
the economic effect of an FTA triad on America. To set the stage for the
discussion of customs union theory, however, it will first be necessary to briefly
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review the gains generally expected from an open multilateral international
trading system.
A. TRADITIONAL GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The most basic benefits from trade among national actors in an open
international system center on the acquisition of essential raw materials, the
promotion of competition, and the creation of international interdependence. '^'^^
The acquisition of raw materials allows nations to produce products and enhance
processes that would be impossible using only national resources. Sales of these
resources provide benefits to trading partners also in the form of cash return from
sales. International competition, on the most general level, promotes the well-
being of consumers by allowing greater consumer choice and lower prices. The
creation of international interdependence may also be a basic advantage of trade,
creating through trading relationships spill-over effects in other economic and
political areas of national concern.
The above benefits promote systemic economic efficiency. However, those
are not the only potential gains from free international trade. Other, more
important processes are also at work.
British economist David Ricardo first formulated the concept of "comparative
advantage" over 150 years ago.^"^ This theory conceptualizes the advantages
gained through national product specialization in terms of the minimization of
"opportunity" costs and superior allocation of the factors of production. Thus, in
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a theoretical two product/two country world, each nation would gain by
producing one product internally and purchasing the other from its trading
partner. These savings, realized through national specialization and visible in
terms of the reduced opportunity costs of the production of two products, also
exist in a broader, multiple-good trading system.^**
The creation of comparative advantage is not the only other gain realized
from free international trade. Economies of scale can also be created.*^"^
Economies of scale generally occur when specialization, technological innovation,
or experience lower production costs and allow more efficient use of the factors
of production.^°^ Though often discussed in terms of a two country system, this
benefit too is seen in the open multilateral trading system.
Through the gains discussed above, the value of free trade is realized,
making it a "first best solution" for the structure of the international system.
Renown economist Paul Samuelson argues that in such a system, "free trade and
ideal transfers could give a similar maximal world utility frontier for all
individuals."^"^
Comparative advantage, economies of scale, and other benefits provide the
gains associated with an international system based on multilateral free trade. Are
there, however, practices that can degrade this system? The answer is yes. Tariffs
and non-tariff barriers may inhibit system effectiveness. These national practices
will generally decrease the efficiency of the open multilateral system.
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Tariffs have both revenue and protection effects which may combine to
generally reduce the expected gain from international trade. Though it has been
generally accepted that tariffs affect third country suppliers and consumers of
protected products, there may also be negative effects on other firms, particularly
those exporting products to international markets. In this way, tariffs (and non-
tariff barriers) can impose artificial taxes.^"** In a similar way, non-tariff barriers
generally reduce gains from trade through price, trade, and other market
distorting effects. ^°^ These barriers generally take the form of quotas,
discrimjnatory taxes, customs valuations, and increasingly, negotiated variable
export restrictions (VERs).
The disintegration of the GATT structure and increases in levels of
international protectionism may be making the "first best" solution of an open
multilateral trading system impossible to achieve. As argued in the opening
chapters, another solution may exist in the formation of free trading areas. Is the
FTA alternative a "second best" solution? If so, what impact will such a solution
have on America? Discussion of these and related questions will require the
consideration of customs union theory.
B. CUSTOMS UNION THEORY-STATIC EFFECTS AND THE GLOBAL
TRIAD
Customs union theory as a distinct area of economic analysis dates from the
1950s. In that era, economist Jacob Viner challenged traditional perceptions of
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customs union's economic effects and began a formal discussion which continues
today.^^*^
Viner's central thesis was based on his dispute of the historical argument
concerning the benefits of customs unions. This argument, aptly restated by
economist Richard Lipsey, asserts that:
Free trade maximizes world welfare; a customs union reduces tariffs and is
therefore a movement towards free trade; a customs union will, therefore,
increase world welfare even if it does not lead to a world welfare
maximum.'^^^
Viner and other like-minded economists, by introducing the concepts of
trade creation and trade diversion, argued credibly that customs union formation
is not:
...equivalent to a move to free trade since it amounts to free trade between
the members and protection vis-a-vis the outside world. This combination
of free trade and protectionism could result in 'trade creation' and /or 'trade
diversion'. '^^'^
Focusing primarily on the costs of production, these two concepts revolutionized
the economic exploration of customs unions.*^^^
Generally, trade creation is defined as a change in a nation's purchasing
habits for a particular product from higher-cost internal (national) source of
supply toward lower-cost supply source in a union partner state. It is trade
creating in that the first nation is buying goods from a union partner that were
previously produced at home at higher cost. This increases economic efficiency
by promoting the use of the lowest cost suppliers for a particular good within the
union. Alternatively, trade diversion is defined as the replacement of less
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expensive products produced externally to the union with higher cost products
produced within the union. This decreases economic efficiency because the lowest
cost supplier for a particular good is no longer utilized.
More specific definitions address the finer distinctions of economic theory
inherent in these phenomena. Economists Augosto de la Torre and Margaret R.
Kelly explain:
On the supply side, gains from trade creation most frequently occur as
resources previously engaged in costly production for the home market are
reallocated to producing exports that enjoy preferential access to other
members' markets (intra-union or internal trade creation). Gains may also
arise by stimulating the production of exports for the outside world (extra-
union or external trade creation). On the demand side, consumers gain from
trade creation because of lower prices and a greater variety of goods and
services."^'*
With respect to trade diversion they further expound that losses accrue to
consumers:
...as imports are now purchased from suppliers within the union that are
less efficient than suppliers outside the union. The higher cost of these
goods offsets the internal market prices attributable to lower intra-union
trade barriers. From the point of view of the member country, this trade
diversion means that tariff revenues for the government (or quota rents to
importers) are now paid implicitly as subsidy (to) production in other
member countries.^'^
Several other effects associated with trade diversion and creation bear
mentioning. First, member gains may result from union formation through the
creation of natural rents produced by lower trade costs and preferential market
access.'^^ Second, depending on the structure of international trade and
demand/supply elasticities, trade diversion may improve the terms of trade for
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member countries with large world market shares through the reduction of
certain transaction costs.*^^^ Improv^ements in the terms of trade then, in a
circular manner, diminish the impact of trade diversion. This effect might be
particularly important for the U.S. since North American share of world trade is
large (approximately 30 percent of total world trade). The gains from this
phenomena could provide real economic benefits for the U.S. Finally, trade
creation is likely to be high and trade diversion low if tariffs of outside countries
are high, tariffs of prospective members are high before union creation, or union
formation results in substantial tariff reduction.'^^*
It seems obvious on the surface that trade creation is economically desirable
while trade diversion is not. Viner essentially concluded that the relative strength
of the effects of trade diversion and trade creation determined whether or not a
customs union enhanced overall economic efficiency. More recently de la Torre
and Kelly echoed Viner's conclusion, stating: "the net impact (of a customs union)
is an empirical question and depends on net static and dynamic effects of trade
creation and diversion.^'^
Wonnacott and Lutz argue that the distinctions between these two
phenomena leads to some initial conclusions.'^^ First, increases in levels of
internal trade between agreement members do not necessarily reflect the
economic success of the union. This is because such effects can be either positive
or negative depending their trade creating or diverting tendency."' Second,
because of the potentially trade diverting effects of a preferential agreement
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negotiated on partial basis (only certain goods covered), the best agreement is one
which covers all products traded by the potential union.^
Clearly, based on the above theories, the measurement of the static effects
of an international triangle of FTAs (in terms of welfare effects for the U.S.)
appears to be best accomplished through the empirical analysis of trade diversion
and creation.^^ Unfortunately, empirical quantification (outside of models) of
such effects is not really possible at this juncture due to these groups' stage of
development.
The formal "theory of second best," as it applies to customs unions, results
from Viner's ideas of trade diversion and creation. It appears to have been first
iterated by Richard Lipsey in 1957. This theory postulates that:
If it is impossible to satisfy all the optimum conditions (in the case of free
trade making all relative prices equal to all rates of transformation), then a
change which brings about the satisfaction of some of the optimum
conditions (in this case a customs union) may make things better or worse
(depending on the degree of trade creation/ diversion).*^224
The concept of second best subsequently came to define customs union theory.
Based on the above theories, some basic observations are possible. To begin,
since trade creation/diversion effects are not yet possible to measure, it is clear
that if only static customs union theory is considered, that an international system
based on an FTA triad system would be a "second best" solution. A solution
based on an open multilateral trading system would obviously be "first best."
Unfortunately, because of the failure of the GATT and growing trends
toward protectionism in the international system (which many argue are led by
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the United States) a "first best" solution may not be realistically achievable.^^
If not, then a system based on regional trade liberalization might provide a viable
"second best" alternative. If nothing else a regional relationship might forestall
rising protectionism, a possible "third best" solution. At best such relationships
might provide an avenue for a return to a more open system by creating
confidence in its members of their trading partners' commitment to a international
trading system based on free trade relationships.
As a nation dependent on international trade, for the United States a "second
best" solution means that some welfare loss in a regionally oriented system is
probable. It is important to note, however, that since protectionism does act as an
effective tax on all exports, the welfare losses incurred might be somewhat less
than those currently imposed through protectionist practices. "^^
It is also important to note that the general effects associated with trade
diversion and creation may be diminishing as trade becomes more and more
international in nature. As geographic borders to trade blur due to the
globalization of trade and investment, and as multi-national corporations (MNCs)
continue to grow, trade diversion effects are not isolated to specific countries. One
example of this trend would be the national corporation which builds its products
overseas having its sales diverted by higher-cost partner country production.^''
Trade diversion and creation concepts lead to other important general
conclusions. First, trade creation is most likely to outweigh diversion if the
potential members are natural trading partners. ^** That is, if the prospective
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partners are already major trading partners (share a high the volume of intra-
regional trade as compared to external trade), are close geographically, and
generally are competitive economically, the gains of trade creation are likely to
be high. The first two parts of this idea are relatively non-controversial. It is
relatively clear that if a group of countries are already major trading partners then
the uniform reduction of tariffs in a customs union scheme is likely to improve
terms of trade for all concerned. Likewise, geographic proximity and associated
low transportation costs may make tariff reduction via customs union efficiency
enhancing.
The third concept is slightly more complicated. This point, originally made
by Viner, has often been construed to mean that union partners should be
competitive economically to maximize trade creation. The degree of overall
competitiveness, though important, is not the whole story. This concept also has
a component concerning internal complementarity. This involves the difference
between partner country cost structures. If member cost structure for a given
protected product are highly dissimilar (complementary), gains from trade
creation per dollar of trade in that particular area can be great as the lower cost
country exploits its comparative advantage. This does not lessen the argument for
overall competitiveness as trade being creating. It simply emphasizes that given
trade creation will occur overall (member country costs are at or below world cost
levels), gains will be greater if complementarity in a particular product area
exists.^^
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Though it is not completely possible to discern whether or not the three
blocs are "natural" trading partners (based on the available data), a determination
of each blocs levels of intra-regional trade and geographic contiguity may give
some indication of the propensity for trade creation within each bloc.
In terms of intra-regional trade some interesting specifics come to light. The
strength of these relationships may indicate a propensity toward trade creation
in all three areas.
Recently in the EC, substantially more trade has been intra-regional than
extra regional (Appendix G).'''^^ Additionally, based on the Cecchini Report,
levels of intra-EC trade are expected to increase by five or six percent as a result
of the single market.'^''^
In North America, the home of the future NAFTA, intra-regional trade
makes up a greater portion of total trade than exports to any other region. In
1989, 63.6 percent of Canadian imports were from the United States and 70.7
percent of Canadian exports were exported to the U.S.. Also, 66.6 percent of
Mexican imports were from the U.S. while 63.3 percent of Mexican exports went
to the U.S.'"*^ Such large regional trade statistics, plus the fact that Canada and
Mexico are America's first and third largest trading partners, likely have meaning
for the discernment of a "natural" trading relationship.^"'^
Finally, though the Asia-Pacific's intra-regional flows were the least of the
three, they were at least as large as their external (inter-regional) trade flows.
They also continue to grow at a faster pace than intra-regional trade in the EC or
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North America.^^ Here, 1989 imports of regional origin averaged approximately
35.8 percent among Asian nations while Asian destinations claimed an average
of approximately 27.7 percent of exports.^^^
Without too much examination it is evident that all three blocs are relatively
close geographically. This is particularly true in the case of NAFTA where all
three members share borders. It is also generally true in the case of the EC. In
that FTA, all current members but Greece share land or close-aboard regional sea
borders. Of the potential members with applications pending, only Malta and
Turkey are relatively widely separated from their potential FTA partners. In the
case of the Asian FTA the condition of geographic contiguity is somewhat less
true, however, all of the potential partners except Japan (who may not be a
directly participating member anyway) are located in the South China Sea
geographic region.
In terms of complementarity or competitiveness, distinctions are difficult to
make because of a lack of FTA relative cost data. Despite this lack of data, a look
at regional commodity shares of trade calls attention to some noteworthy
facts.^''^ In the EC a high percentage of exports from all members consists of
food and live animals (averaging 13.5 percent), basic manufactures (21.3 percent),
and machinery/transport equipment (28 percent). In North America, though food
and live animals make up smaller shares, similar trends are seen in basic
manufactures and machinery /transport equipment (forming 11.9 and 33.6 percent
of exports respectively). ASEAN and the NIEs also share some roughly equivalent
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export areas. In particular, high percentages of export commonality can be seen
in basic manufactures (13.6 percent), machinery /transport equipment (24.2
percent). Differences do, however, arise in crude materials excluding fuels and
miscellaneous/manufactured goods (16.2 and 22.7 percent of export share).'^''^
Given the industrialized or industrializing state of these potential FTAs,
these numbers are not completely surprising. Srill, though by no means
conclusive, these figures give a preliminary indication of competitiveness within
and among these FTAs. Competitive sectors seem to be indicated both within and
between potential FTAs.
Clearly more investigation is needed, particularly in the form of sector and
product cost structure evaluation, to make positive conclusions as to the static
effects of the hypothesized trilateral system of FTAs. However, because of the size
and structure of exishng trading relationships, general geographic contiguity, and
seemingly competitive internal markets, an initial judgement that trade creation
may predominate in such a system is not unwarranted. Certainly it cannot be
definitively stated, based on existing data concerning stahc effects, that an FTA
triad system will be inevitably be trade diverting. Consequently, possible dynamic
effects of an FTA system must next be investigated to see if any potential negative
effects appear.
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C DYNAMIC EFFECTS AND THE GLOBAL TRIAD
The preceding discussion generally addressed only static or one-time effects
of customs unions. Dynamic effects may also occur. Such effects operate through
economies of scale, spillover phenomena, competitive relationships, investment
climate changes, rates of technological change, and consumption "smoothing. "*^^^**
These effects also bear discussion.
Of particular interest are economies of scale, which can have both static and
dynamic effects. A thesis advanced by Wonnacott and Lutz argues that economies
of scale may be more important than Viner allowed. This is because economies
of scale may make it possible for even a trade diverting union to promote
economic efficiency by allowing members open access to larger markets than were
available prior to union formation. Particularly if non-tariff barriers were a factor
prior to union formation, this can promote trade even if overall union effects
seem to be trade diverting.^^'
These effects operate two ways.^^° The first is through the firm where
lower costs and increased productivity allow firms that previously operated
below efficient levels to expand output and move down their cost curves. The
second is industry-wide, where spillover effects and other externalities promote
cost reductions.
The potentials associated with such scale implications could mean that even
trade diverting FTAs might promote economic gains as a nation's firms use
economies of scale to parley internal FTA competitiveness into competitiveness
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in the greater international system. The result would be lower cost goods for not
only its own members but the other actors in the international trading system as
well. Economist Ali El-Agraa adds that, in principle:
In unions where economies of scale may be in part external to national
industries, the rationale for unions rests upon the recognition of the
externalities and market imperfections which extend beyond the boundaries
of national states. In such circumstance, unilateral national action will not
be optimal whilst integrated action offers the scope for potential gain.*^^'
In both these cases, gains for the international system would likely result in
benefit gains for the United States as well.
Economies of scale and their associated spillover effects (such as improved
direct knowledge transfer) can also lower costs and increase productivity in a
more traditional manner by increasing levels of competition, improving the
international investment climate, increasing the pace of technological change, and
reducing economic uncertainty. Competition provides relative price reliability
which increases market transparency and lowers prices. It also helps spur
technological improvements. Stability related improvements in the international
investment climate provide gains through investor confidence-building and
increased commitment reliability. Such improvements also increase the ability of
entrepreneurs to reap the rewards of innovation. Here again it is possible for both
the international trading system and America to benefit.
Consumption smoothing requires some brief discussion. This phenomena
concerns the effects created by unrestricted access to world markets and the
ability of actors to compensate for fluctuations in the business cycle. A related
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idea, initially argued by Lipsey, concluded that trade diverting customs unions
may have the effect of lessening distortions in patterns of consumption, thereby
compensating for negative trade diversion effects. '^'^ Benefits realized by
reduced trade diversion may improve efficiency in the global trading system.
Positive benefits for the U.S. could be based in these effects as well.
D. OTHER EFFECTS AND THE GLOBAL TRIAD
Other potential external effects of a customs unions bear some mention.
These effects are based in the phenomena described by a non-tariff barrier
argument, a unified action argument, various political arguments, and most
importantly, a system openness argument.
The non-tariff barrier argument emphasizes that the "...replacement of tariffs
with quantitative restraints over the last several decades has muddied the analysis
of trade diversion; it has provided another reason why trade diversion need not
be bad." This is because quantitative restrictions may have previously restrained
a nation's low cost partner from supplying internal markets. When quantitative
restrictions are dropped as part of FTA liberalization, the lowest cost producer
reenters the national market and economic efficiency is promoted. Such cost
minimization benefits would likely benefit the FTA, negate some trade diversion,
and provide gains for the international system. Given the high proportional use
of non-tariff barriers by the U.S., such a phenomena could benefit this country.
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Simply stated the unified action argument asserts that nations acting
together are more likely to exert an external influence than nations acting
alone.''*'^ A group of nations is also able to negotiate from a stronger bargaining
position. Such an argument would seem to provide support for the efficiency of
an FTA for America. Indeed this effect has been observed in EC actions to
improve its terms of trade over the years. '^^ However, because of the possibility
of joint retaliation by other groups of nations, the effect of this phenomena in a
triad system is indeterminant until empirical data is available. Thus, it is
impossible to predict effects of an EC, NAFTA, and Asian FTA triad on America
in terms of this economic event.
Political arguments also have potential economic impacts on FTAs. First, it
has been proposed that because of the current difficulties in multilateral trade
negotiations such as GATT, an FTA triad might eliminate "convoy," "free rider,"
and other multilateral political problems. For the U.S., these political occurrences
create potentially large negative economic effects in a number of areas. If such
barriers could be eliminated through a triad based system of FTAs the U.S. would
clearly be better off. Such positive effects may be likely if the preliminary success
achieved by negotiations such as the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and
the January 1992 U.S.-Japanese Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks are
any guide.
A second political argument, that an FTA triad will negatively impact the
future of vital "strategic" industries, is less well defined. Obviously, if a global
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system of FTAs resulted in the loss of certain American industries (like submarine
and combat aircraft manufacturing), it would have negative implications for the
U.S.. However, such an outcome is not likely in the short term due to clear
American technical advantage in many of these areas. In the long term, even if
such an unlikely outcome was achieved, the retention of such industries is not
best served through protectionist or isolationist measures either in or out of a
global FTA system. Rather, such industries would be better protected (from an
economic point of view) by subsidization of essential levels of production. This
would have direct benefits for the affected industry which protectionist measures
could not hope to achieve.
The critical open system argument asserts that substantial trade diversion
may occur, distorting comparative advantage, diverting FDI from external
projects, and ultimately driving non-members from the market if a "fortress"
mentality develops in any customs union.^^^ Such a mentality could result in the
erection of high external tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This effect would,
according to de la Torre and Kelly, "...have large negative effects on world GDP,
on most countries, and on all regions, including the region that increases
protection. "^"^
Clearly the degree of openness in a customs union or an FTA can make a
difference. If external discrimination is low, tariff reductions resulting from trade
liberalization might benefit non-members through previously mentioned concepts
of economies of scale and their associated spillover effects.
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An ongoing study by economists Murray Kemp and Henry Wan Jr. gives a
degree of certainty to the above thesis concerning system openness in noting that:
...there exists a common tariff vector which leaves world prices, and
therefore the trade and welfare of non-members, at their pre-union levels.
If the net trade vector of the union is view^ed as a (constant) endowment, it
is then plausible that both the union as a whole and (after appropriate
internal transfers) each member must be left not worse off by the removal
of internal barriers to trade.
Kemp and Wan add that the above proposition:
...implies that an incentive to form and enlarge customs unions persists until
the world becomes one big customs union, that is, until world free trade
prevails .^^^
What this essentially means is that, if FTA barriers remain at their pre-union
levels after FTA formation, then international actors external to the FTA are not
made worse off by the FTA. Instead, they may be left better off depending on the
degree of increase in total trade with FTA members (and relative price
differentials) after union formation.
It must be noted that these propositions are closely related to what can be
called a "market access" argument. These state specifically that the degree of
outward orientation of a customs union in terms of external tariff levels is what
determines its effect on the rest of the world. That open and outwardly oriented
economies grow more rapidly has been repeatedly proven in the case of
developing countries. '^*^ Presumably these effects are translatable to FTAs as
well.
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A final point relates to this argument. It is important to remember that a free
trade area does not normally presume or require common external trade policy
as does a customs union.^*'^ This difference is important in terms of an FTAs
ability to minimize trade diversion problems. By retaining the ability to
independently lower tariffs, the FTA member retains the ability to ensure the use
of the most efficient supplier of specific products form the world market. Though
having the possible negative effect of reducing the value of its FTA trade
concessions, retention of this capability provides a great measure of flexibility not
found in customs unions. Further, because external policies are based on differing
member policies, an FTA is less likely than a customs union or common market
to implement tariffs (or other barriers) that create distortions in the global trading
system.^^°
As of this writing, no modelling has been done specifically on the openness
issue in terms of FTA systems. However, one model, developed by economists
Glenn W. Harrison and E.E. Rutstrom, examined the results of a trilateral trade
war between the U.S., the EC, and Japan.-^^^ Though highly subject to the
entering assumptions, this model concluded that GNP would fall steeply in all
countries except the EC and the U.S. when high barriers were imposed "across the
board" by all three actors. Though the U.S. and the EC were seen to gain on
balance from the trade war (subject to certain assumptions) the international
system was clearly worse off. Also, other nations in the would have significant
incentive to retaliate against the three main actors to eliminate any gains.
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Though the above shidy cannot be directly linked to our discussion of
regionalism, some inferences can clearly be drawn for a system based on an
economic triad. The study seems to confirm that the hostile imposition of tariffs
in a trilateral system can be highly damaging. This drives home the point
hypothesized by economists that the economic success of an international system
anchored by three FTAs is critically determined by its ability to retain existing
external barriers or impose lower ones. It seems that no other single fact is as
determinant for the future of an FTA-based system.
E. SUMMARY OF FTA ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Viner's conclusions regarding trade diversion and creation, though critical
to the formulation of general customs union theory, may not account for all of the
static and dynamic effects present in a modern international system based on
three large Free Trade Areas. Mitigating effects, including the initial structure of
international trade, the nature of FTA member relationships, economic factors,
political realities, and, most critically, resulting system structure may combine to
minimize any negative effects of trade diversion.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
America has a historical tradition of reliance on trade as the economic
foundation of its domestic well-being. Because of this fundamental reliance on
access to the international marketplace for its exports, the future of international
trade regulation mechanisms has serious national security implications.
It has been demonstrated that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the paradigm used to regulate international trade since shortly after World War
II, is failing. Disagreements on agricultural reform, trade in services, intellectual
property rights, and enforcement mechanisms prevent compromise between the
agreement's most influential signatories. Institutional problems and a changing
international order exacerbate the agreement's failure. As a result, ongoing
Uruguay Round negotiations, conducted under GATT auspices in Geneva, are
unlikely to succeed. More importantly, even if talks do result in a weakened
compromise agreement, GATT may remain unable to control the course of future
international trade. Because America's vital national interest in trade appears to
be threatened, such a failure clearly creates an important problem for American
policymakers.
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Because of the failure of GATT, the international conditions necessary to
ensure the survival of multilateral free trade, seen by most economists as a "first
best" choice for global trading relationships, may no longer be assured. The most
visible response of the international system has been to place increased emphasis
on regional trading arrangements. The European Community, the North
American Free Trade Area, and a fledgling Asian Free Trade Area appear to be
the largest, and to date, the most successful, of these developing regional
organizations.
Analysis of the potential economic effects of these developing FTA
relationships makes clear the difficulty of predicting any results in advance.
Obviously, the effects of such a system cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty without post-formation empirical data. Nevertheless, fundamentally
positive economic effects, based in gains from economies of scale and efficiency
increases, do appear to be possible. Though these effects are "second best" when
compared to a multilateral system of free trade, they are clearly more productive
than an international trade regime based on unilateralism.
The potentially positive economic effects of a triad system are, however, tied
to the certain natural geographic and economic factors as well as the critical
measure of the size and depth of FTA external barriers. Clearly, if external
barriers are either maintained at the status quo (or lowered) in such a system, a
regionally oriented system cannot be condemned based on the data that currently
exists. In fact, if openness is truly institutionalized in such a system, then it could
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have overall positive effects through the economic gains associated with the
creation of scale economies. Such a system could, in fact, provide ultimately
beneficial economic results for the United States.
Perhaps more importantly, this research has highlighted the fact that
regional integration in the form of FTAs may, if properly pursued, provide a
viable alternative path to international trade liberalization under GATT. Such a
dynamic outcome, if realized, would clearly make a regionally based system in
the short term best interests of both the United States and other international
actors, particularly as GATT fails. Preliminary results are encouraging. For that
reason alone they are worthy of consideration in the U.S. policymaking process.
Continued empirical research into all of the economic effects of a global
trading system based on three large FTAs is needed. Moreover, until solid
empirical data is gained from the actual operation of a trilateral global system no
absolute conclusions can be formed. But, given the fundamental economic theory
on FTA formation, and considering the available empirical data, no specific
economic aspect of an international economic system based on a few large FTAs
makes it inherently unsuitable for use as a secondary framework for international




Free Trade Areas are clearly a "second best" solution when compared to
multilateral free trade. Since this fact is beyond challenge, American trade policy
should acknowledge that a consensus driven "first best" solution based on
multilateral free trade remains the most desirable outcome of the ongoing
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Thus, in the short term, the continued
pursuit of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
is an appropriate primary policy goal for America.
However, the recognition that regional trade regimes have economic viability
as an alternative to GATT-based trade management allows the U.S. greater
negotiating freedom than has previously been available. As a consequence, the
U.S. representatives to Uruguay Round negotiations must remain firm in
maintaining U.S. demands in GATT negotiations. That is, they must continue to
emphasize the importance of implementing strict rules regulating agricultural
subsidies, the creation of a solid regime for the regulation of trade in services,
standardized intellectual property rights, the limitation of non-tariff barriers, and
the creation of an effective dispute settlement/ enforcement process. Concession
based negotiations with the EC should thus be discouraged and a firmer policy
line should be emphasized. "^^"^ Failure to conclude the Uruguay Round (or, at
best, an inadequate agreement) would be the likely outcome. -^'^^
This short term policy plan will not, however, be sufficient to sustain
America in the future. A GATT failure is not an occasion for rejoicing by even the
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most inwardly focused American. Some structure must be created that is capable
of effectively managing world trade in the coming years. As a result, a new policy
approach must be created to guarantee America's essenhal economic interests in
the longer term. Three basic policy alternatives are available and all are worthy
of brief consideration.
A first possibility might be for the U.S. to become more isolationist,
narrowing its focus to concentrate only on the domestic economy and the
development of trade regulating mechanisms within the context of a closed
NAFTA system. Such a policy choice, however, would neglect both the leadership
role played by America in the global economy (which though diminished is still
vital) and the importance of establishing favorable trading relationships for the
approximately $369 billion in American exports iJ7 percent of total annual
exports) that are traded with nations outside of North America. Isolationism is not
a viable policy option.
A second policy choice could involve a shift in national priorities toward an
open NAFTA as the sole trade regulating structure for the United States. Any
effort to revitalize the GATT process would thus be abandoned (or at least
marginalized by decreased American interest in a successful outcome) and full
emphasis would be placed on expanding the membership of the NAFTA
structure. The most intractable problem with this approach would be the
difficulty of negotiating the entrance into NAFTA of other, extremely diverse,
national economies. Yet, because of the external trade orientation of America, the
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inclusion of a large number of international actors would remain fundamentally
important to American exporters. If their entrance was negotiated multilaterally,
NAFTA would likely come, in time, to resemble GATT (with all of its problems
in achieving consensus). If, on the other hand, their entrance was negotiated only
in terms of a limited agreement between the subject country and current NAFTA
partners, the possibility that resentment would be created among other members
as each country received a "tailored" deal would be so great as to make eventual
fragmentation probable. For these reasons this policy option seems unworkable
as well.
A third and final policy approach seems to provide the most appropriate
American response to the current trend toward economic regionalism. This idea
is based on a dual track approach for the U.S trade policy, emphasizing a
commitment to revitalize the GATT structure and at the same time, a resolve to
sustain the ongoing drive toward the development of a regionally-based trade
management regime. Such a solution would acknowledge the inherently
complementary nature of global and regional trade management organizations
and, at the same time, combine American trade policies that are currently separate
and distinct into a coherent policy platform.
Under this policy umbrella, significant changes to GATT would be proposed.
First among these would be a review of Article 24, the GATT article governing
regional trading relationships. It would be urged that this article be clarified so
as to more fully define the requirements for a GATT-consistent regional trade
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association.^^ Other changes would be included. The most important among
them would be an firm effort to replace the weak, consensus-based GATT
decisionmaking process with a majority based system of decisionmaking. This
evolutionary step is vital if GATT credibility is to be restored.
The creation of a GATT Regional Council would also be proposed, with
membership consisting of representatives from all Article 24 compliant FTAs. The
new regional council of GATT might have several important features. First, it
could be given a mandate to consider innovative solutions to the "most difficult"
trade policy issues associated with agriculture, textiles, services, and dispute
settlement procedures. Such a mandate might allow the translation of innovative
solutions to the these difficult problems that were negotiated on a regional basis
to be translated to the international arena. Second, it could, by promoting majority
rule decisionmaking, by limiting each regional association to one vote, and by
forcing FTA compliance with Article 24 rules promote more rapid decision
implementation. Such a council might play an effective role in GATT as a
negotiating forum for the representatives of growing regional economic
groupings. "
Pursuit of an regional approach toward the management of North American
trade (presumably based on the current NAFTA proposal) would also continue.
This policy approach would, even more than it does at present, emphasize
complete compliance with Article 24 regulations. Flowever, instead of being a
separate and distinct policy initiative as it is at present, NAFTA would form a
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valuable second tier of U.S. trade policy. This policy change would send the
message to GATT negotiating partners that the U.S. would accept the "second
best" alternative provided by regional FTAs in the event of that GATT
revitalization was unsuccessful. Such a policy stance might well convince
America's negotiating partners in GATT to be more conciliatory on previously
insurmountable issues. It also would also clearly ensure that the U.S. maintained
an effective fall-back regional trade management regime in the event of the total
collapse of the GATT revitalization effort.
The above policy approach would require that the United States once again
assume an aggressive leadership role in the global economy. Given the potentially
positive economic effects of FTAs previously discussed, however, this may not be
such a risky policy proposition. Further, such an approach would not require the
massive commitment of funds or the granting of concessions that currently
characterize U.S. trade policy. It simply requires a credible public commitment to
pursue radically different policy alternatives.
That such an initiative eventually would become a coercive process even for
the U.S. is without doubt. However, the alternative, the establishing of a "third
best" world trading system as GATT falters appears to be even less attractive. For
this reason this policy approach is the only practical alternative for continued
American economic leadership in the global economy.
The development of such a structure will require concentrated
negotiation between international actors and institutions, as well as continued
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research to find the correct structural format. Also, it must be admitted that such
radical restructuring does not lend itself to full evaluation prior to its imposition.
However, with intelligent innovation along the way, such a combined approach
might realistically provide the credible infrastructure necessary to manage
international trade in the future. Such an outcome would clearly help make the
global economy, now in crisis, both more stable and productive. Regional
agreements would thus provide an essential catalyst for the creation of future
economic growth. America's essential trading links will be preserved and a more
inclusive global economic structure based on international economic reciprocity
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APPENDIX A: GATT ROUNDS SINCE WWII
SEVEN ROUNDS OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN
COMPLETED UNDER GATT AUSPICES SINCE WW II:
1. Geneva negotiations 1947 (45,000 tariff concessions)
2. Annecy negotiations 1949 (modest tariff reductions)
3. Torquay negotiations 1950-51 (reduced tariffs 25 percent from 1948 level)
4. Geneva negotiations 1955-56 (modest tariff reductions)
5. Geneva negotiations (Dillon round) 1959-62 (modest reductions)
6. Geneva negotiations (Kennedy round) 1963-67 (average tariff reductions-35
percent for industrial products, minimal reductions in agricultural products,
anti-dumping code)
7. Geneva negotiations (Tokyo round) 1973-79 (average tariff reductions-34
percent for industrial products, non-tariff trade barrier codes)
8. Geneva negotiations (Uruguay round) September 1986-present
Source: "The Uruguay Round," Finance and Dei^elopnient, June 1991, p. 10.
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APPENDIX B: GATT STRUCTURE
GATT Secretariat:
The GATT Secretariat is a relatively small group composed of national
specialist representatives and trade professionals with an established reputation
for "professionalism" and "efficiency." The group's mandate tasks it to promote
"the preservation, enhancement, and enforcement of the rules of the existing
trading order." Currently headed by long-time Director-General Arthur Dunkel,
this body effectively and unobtrusively orchestrates GATT management,
detection, and dispute settlement actions (including monitoring of injury claims
and authorization of retaliation).
GATT Council:
The Council of Representatives was set up by the contracting parties in 1960
to replace the 1951 "Intercessional Committee" authorized to conduct mail or
telegraphic voting between sessions. It meets every four to six weeks and consists
of 49 representatives from governments "...willing to assume special
responsibilities such as carrying out advisory work and recommending draft
resolutions for mail or telegraphic approval by all the contracting parties." This
staff also offers technical assistance and training programs world-wide. Like the
Secretariat this body is known for dedicated professionalism in the execution of
GATT policies.
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GATT International Trade Center:
A sub-organization of thie GATT, the International Trade Center, was
established in 1964. This group has been jointly operated by the GATT and the
UN Conference on Trade and Development since 1968. Its mission, to carry out
activities in support of the trade promotion efforts of developing countries, is
effectively performed through information and advisory services available to all
developing countries.
Sources: Werner J. Feld and Robert S Jordan with Leon Hurwitz, International Or^^anizatwns: A Comparative
Approach, 2nd ed., (New York: Prager Publishers, 1991), p. 93.; David Pitt and Thomas G. Weiss eds.. The
Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 90.; Harold K. Jacobson, Networks
of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political Si/stem, 2nd ed., (New York Alfred A.
Knopf Inc., 1984), p. 261, and Everyone's United Nations (New York: UN Department of Public
h-iformation,1986), p. 427.
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APPENDIX C: GATT SUB-BODIES
CURRENT 20 SUB-BODIES UNDER GATT:
Committee on trade and development. Consultative Group of 18, Committee on
Balance of Payment Restrictions, Committee on Budget-Finance and
Administration, Committee of Participating Countries, Textiles Committee,
Textiles surveillance Body, Committee on Tariff Concessions, Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices, Committee on Customs Valuation, Committee on Government
Procurement, Committee on Import Licensing, Committee on Subsides and
Countervailing Measures, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Committee
on Trade in Civil Aircraft, International Meat Council, International Dairy Product
Council, Committee on Safeguards, Committee on Trade in Agriculture, Group
on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Measures.
Source: Everyone's United Nations (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1986), p.
427.
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APPENDIX D: EC MEMBERSHIP
Current EC membership includes: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain (1973), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), Greece
(1981), Spain, and Portugal.
Non-EC members with applications pending: Malta, Turkey, Austria,
Sweden, and Cyprus.
EFTA members expected to join the EC include: Sweden, Switzerland,
Iceland, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Liechtenstein.
Associate members lobbying for full membership: Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia.




MECHANICS OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
General Provisions:
1. All tariffs to be eliminated immediately, or in equal annual reductions over five
to ten years, (in practical application the agreement required a 10 year schedule
for the elimination of steel and other critical tariffs with a 35 percent reduction
occurring over five years and the remaining reductions spread over the rest of
the period).
2. Some non-tariff barriers to trade in agriculture to be removed.
3. Both countries retain the right to use anti-dumping and countervailing duties
against injurious subsidies or discriminatory pricing.
4. Further negotiation on government procurement to be undertaken not more
than one year after renegotiation of GATT codes. (Actually negated the U.S.
"Buy America" Act shortly after)
Other Provisions:
The agreement essentially eliminated most import/export restrictions
between the two countries. Additionally, the agreement aligned product technical
standards over 10 years, eliminated conditional import licenses for grains,
eliminated transport subsidies for poultry and eggs, eliminated investment
restrictions, implemented stricter intellectual property rights, and aligned laws on
sales of services across the border.
Rules of origin were also addressed. These rules allow entry of goods that
are wholly produced in the respective country, imported materials that have been
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changed in commercially significant ways, or goods that have had over 50 percent
of processing costs paid by either country.
In the area of dispute settlement procedures "snap back" provisions were
included in the agreement that allow the reimposihon of tariffs by either country
on severely threatened goods within four days (to provide relief from unfair
competition). More importantly, the agreement developed a dispute
resolution/implementation commission with binding powers of arbitration. This
feature, strongly supported by Canada and initially opposed by the U.S.,
prevented any trade disagreement from standing for an excessive length of time.
Sources: Charles R. Taylor, "North America: The New Competihve Space," The Conference Board (New York:
The Conference Board Incorporateci, 1991), pp 18-19., Toni Dick, "Customs Procedures: Essential? for
Exporting Under the CFTA," Business America, 8 April 1991, p. 17.; and Jim Holbein, "US -Canada PTA
Dispute Settlement," Business America, 8 April 1991, p. 21.
134
APPENDIX F:
THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE FUTURE MEMBER STATES
Mexico:
Mexican objectives in the negotiations, according to Hufbauer and Scliott,
are twofold. First they hope to further secure market access to a North American
market that accounts for three-quarters of their total exports. Second they hope
to "lock in domestic institutional reforms instituted since 1985" in order to send
positive signals to the international community that Mexican trade liberalization
will continue. Further objectives include seeking to weaken U.S. anti-
dumping/countervailing duty laws that protect American industry from
competition, ensuring continued subsidy of certain relatively weak industries,
assuring increased external capital inflow, improving the dispute settlement
process, and participating in the U.S. /Canada FTA "good deal."
Canada:
Canadian objectives in the NAFTA negotiations are somewhat less well
defined. Essentially, they seem to include protection of its industry (particularly
in its apparel, dairy, and poultry industries) from "unfair" competition and
maintenance of wage standards. They are probably also participating out of a
desire to retain both status /visibility in the world trading arena and to avoid a
bilateral U.S.-Mexico agreement that leaves Canada with worse terms. For this
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reason, Hufbauer and Schott appropriately term Canada the "reluctant partner in
the NAFTA negotiations." Other items on the Canadian agenda may be more
obscure. Regardless of their agenda, it is clear that Canada is playing a vital role
as an arbitrator of U.S.-Mexican disputes during the negotiations process.
United States:
General American goals in the NAFTA process are centered in traditional
pursuit of economic growth, increased economic efficiency, and the maintenance
of North American political stability. More specifically, the U.S. is pursuing
increased market access for consumer products, increased investment
opportunities, and increased access to valuable Mexican resources (particularly
oil) that can only be provided by free trade. Finally, America hopes for synergy-
generated income and employment gains that will, according to Hufbauer and
Schott, "..enhance the international competitiveness of firms throughout the
region" and revitalize each countrys' export led growth aims.
Sciurces: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations
(Washington: Institute For International Economics, 1992), pp 10-22, David S Cloud, "Congress VVar\' of Bush
Flan to Open Doors to Mexico," Congressional Quarterly, 23 February 1991, p.454 , and Sidney VVeintraub, Free
Trade Betzi^een tlie U.S. and Mexico? (Wa.shington: The Brooking's Institution, 1984), pp 143-147.
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